GR L 61352; (February, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-61352 February 27, 1987
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
The case involves a claim for loss and damage to a shipment of machine parts. The consignee, Dole Philippines, Inc., received the cargo on December 18, 1971, and filed a formal claim with the carrier, Maritime Company of the Philippines, on May 4, 1972. Dole initially filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 91043) on June 11, 1973, which contained three causes of action. The third cause of action pertained to the shipment in question. On December 11, 1974, the trial court dismissed the first two causes of action due to a settlement and dismissed the third cause of action without prejudice. Consequently, Dole instituted a new and separate complaint for the same shipment on January 6, 1975.
ISSUE
Whether the one-year prescriptive period for filing suit under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) was interrupted or tolled by the consignee’s extrajudicial written demand, thereby making the subsequent complaint filed in 1975 timely.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the action had prescribed. The prescriptive period under Section 3(6) of COGSA is one year from delivery of the goods or the date they should have been delivered. The Court explicitly held that the general provisions of the Civil Code on interruption of prescription, specifically Article 1155, do not apply to claims governed by COGSA. To apply Article 1155 would extend the one-year period, contravening the clear intent of COGSA to settle maritime disputes promptly and finally. This doctrine was established in The Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines, Inc., which the Court reaffirmed.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that an extrajudicial demand could toll the period, Dole’s demand on May 4, 1972, would have started a new one-year period from that date. Dole’s first judicial action was filed on June 11, 1973, which was already beyond this new one-year period. The filing of the new complaint in 1975 was therefore untimely. The Court rejected Dole’s theory that the demand indefinitely suspended the prescriptive period, noting that tolling does not equate to indefinite suspension. The order of dismissal was affirmed.