GR L 6121; (May, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-6121; May 30, 1953
Manuel S. Gamalinda, petitioner, vs. Jose V. Yap, respondent.
FACTS
The respondent, Jose V. Yap, was proclaimed elected as mayor of Victoria, Tarlac, in the 1951 general election. In an election protest, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac ruled he was ineligible, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court. On September 3, 1952, the Acting Executive Secretary, by order of the President, designated Yap as acting mayor of Victoria, pending the election and qualification of a permanent mayor. After Yap took his oath, the petitioner, Manuel S. Gamalinda, the duly elected and qualified Vice-Mayor, demanded Yap turn over the office. Upon Yap’s refusal, Gamalinda instituted this petition for quo warranto, seeking a judicial declaration that he is entitled to occupy the office of mayor.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the petitioner, as Vice-Mayor, is entitled to assume the office of mayor, or whether the respondent’s appointment as acting mayor by the President is valid, following the court’s declaration that the respondent was ineligible and the 1951 election for mayor resulted in a failure to elect.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the respondent’s appointment as acting mayor. The Court held that the 1951 election resulted in a failure to elect a mayor for Victoria, Tarlac, due to the winning candidate’s ineligibility. This situation is governed by Section 21(c) of the Revised Election Code, which requires the President to call a special election as soon as practicable when an election fails to take place or results in a failure to elect. The vacancy created pending such special election is a temporary vacancy under Section 21(a), which for a municipal office, is to be filled by appointment by the provincial governor with the consent of the provincial board. The Court found that the respondent’s designation by the President, made upon the recommendation of the provincial board of Tarlac, could properly be deemed as made with the consent of the provincial board, thus constituting a valid temporary appointment. The provisions relied upon by the petitioner (Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 21(b) of the Revised Election Code) were deemed inapplicable, as they contemplate a vacancy arising from causes subsequent to the qualification of a de jure officer, which was not the case here.