G.R. Nos. L-61079-81, April 15, 1988
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Maria Loren Quizada, appellant.

FACTS

Three separate criminal complaints for grave oral defamation were filed by Cipriana B. Tranquilan against Maria L. Quizada with the provincial fiscal of Surigao del Sur. The complaints alleged that Quizada publicly uttered statements in the Surigaonon dialect, translated to mean that Tranquilan was a woman of ill repute, a prostitute, a paramour of Quizada’s husband, and that her nipples had been squeezed by him. After preliminary investigation, the assistant provincial fiscal filed three corresponding informations in the Court of First Instance. Upon arraignment, Quizada pleaded not guilty to all charges.
Subsequently, Quizada moved to quash the informations, arguing that the imputation of adultery—a private crime—required the defamation case to be initiated exclusively upon the sworn complaint of the offended party herself, not by the fiscal via an information. The trial court agreed and dismissed the cases. The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was denied. The prosecution then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. Quizada countered that reinstating the cases would place her in double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of the criminal cases upon the accused’s motion bars their reinstatement on the ground of double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the dismissal orders, and reinstated the criminal cases. The legal logic is twofold. First, the Court held that the informations were validly filed. While one information contained an imputation of adultery (a private crime), the procedural rules then in force required the complaint filed by the offended party and the preliminary investigation records to be transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of the information. The Court, citing People v. Rondina, ruled that such transmitted complaint, though not formally offered in evidence, was part of the judicial record and cured any procedural defect regarding the mode of initiation. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction.
Second, the Court ruled that double jeopardy did not attach. For double jeopardy to apply, the dismissal must be without the express consent of the accused. Here, the dismissal was granted precisely upon Quizada’s own motion to quash. The only exceptions—dismissal due to insufficiency of prosecution evidence or violation of the right to a speedy trial—were inapplicable. Since the dismissal was based on a perceived lack of jurisdiction at her behest, she cannot later invoke the protection against a second jeopardy. Therefore, the reinstatement of the cases for further proceedings was proper.