G.R. No. L-61016 and L-61107, April 26, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R. MORALES, JR., petitioner, vs. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner, vs. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents.

FACTS

The consolidated cases involve petitions for habeas corpus filed by Horacio R. Morales, Jr. and Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr., who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Orders (PCOs) issued during the period of martial law. The petitioners challenged the validity of their detention, arguing that the PCOs violated constitutional requirements for warrants of arrest, specifically the necessity for a judicial determination of probable cause. The core legal dispute centered on whether the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief under a proclamation of martial law, could validly issue arrest orders without judicial intervention and whether the Supreme Court could review the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE

The primary legal issue is whether a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued during martial law is equivalent to a judicial warrant of arrest requiring a personal determination of probable cause by the issuing authority. A corollary issue is whether the Supreme Court retains the power of judicial review to inquire into the factual sufficiency of the President’s proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as established in Lansang v. Garcia.

RULING

The main opinion, penned by Justice Concepcion, and the concurring opinions reveal a nuanced legal analysis. Justice Gutierrez, in his concurrence, provides critical qualifying observations. He expresses hesitation in equating a PCO with a judicial warrant under Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution . He posits that a PCO is issued by the President as Commander-in-Chief exercising exclusive executive powers to meet grave threats like rebellion, and it represents an exception to the regular judicial procedure. The Letters of Instructions governing PCOs contemplate preliminary judicial examination as the norm, with the PCO as an expedient reserved for situations where judicial process would endanger public order. Therefore, the constitutional warrant requirements do not apply identically.
Regarding judicial review, Justice Gutierrez argues for a restrained application of the Lansang doctrine. He asserts that the power to suspend the writ or proclaim martial law is expressly and exclusively granted to the President by the Constitution and is of a clearly political nature. While the Court may act against patently arbitrary exercises of this power lacking popular support, as a general principle, the determination of the factual bases for such proclamation involves an appraisal of conditions of national security beyond the appropriate range of judicial evidence and notice. This view aligns with the political question doctrine. Justice Makasiar, in a separate opinion, strongly advocates for abandoning Lansang, arguing that the existence of an emergency justifying the suspension of the writ is a political determination solely for the President, beyond judicial review, to prevent a destructive collision between co-equal branches of government.