G.R. No. L-60349-62 December 29, 1983
CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, ASST. CITY FISCALS AGELIO L. BRINGAS, ERNESTO M. BROCOY, RAFAEL V. FLORES, FELIXBERTO L. GUIRITAN, MACARIO B. BALANSAG and ROSARIO F. DABALOS, all of Butuan City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as City Judge of Butuan, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners, the City Fiscal of Butuan and his assistants, filed multiple criminal informations in the City Court of Butuan. Most informations contained a certification by the investigating fiscal that, after conducting a preliminary examination and reviewing sworn statements, there was reasonable ground to believe the crime was committed and the accused was probably guilty. A few informations were filed upon directive of the Minister of Justice or the City Fiscal under P.D. No. 911 . Respondent Judge Villanueva, upon receipt, set hearings to determine the propriety of issuing warrants of arrest. He then issued orders requiring petitioners to submit the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence to aid his judicial review of the probable cause findings.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, their determination of probable cause was sufficient for the court to issue warrants. The judge denied the motions and reiterated his directive. Petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders and compel the issuance of warrants. During the pendency, petitioners eventually submitted the required affidavits to avoid further delay. The judge issued warrants in some cases but, in others, found no prima facie case based on the affidavits and remanded them to the City Fiscal for further investigation.

ISSUE

Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates the judge to issue a warrant of arrest without independent judicial assessment.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the constitutional principle of separation of powers and the specific mandate for judicial determination of probable cause for arrest. The Court held that a fiscal’s certification of probable cause does not bind the judge. The 1973 Constitution, then in force, explicitly required that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This provision imposes a personal and non-delegable duty on the judge to independently ascertain probable cause. The fiscal’s finding is merely preliminary and intended for the purpose of filing the information. The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause based on evidence submitted to the court.
The Court further explained that the applicable procedural rule, the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, explicitly requires the complaint or information to be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses. This requirement enables the judge to make a preliminary determination of whether to dismiss the case outright or proceed further. Respondent judge’s order for submission of affidavits was therefore a valid exercise of his judicial power to review. His subsequent act of remanding certain cases after finding the charges patently without basis from the submitted affidavits was also within his discretion to prevent exposing the accused to unnecessary harassment. The fiscal’s certification, while presumed regular, does not preclude the judge from performing his constitutional duty of independent assessment.