G.R. No. L-60316. January 31, 1983.
Violeta Alday and Ernesto Yu, petitioners, vs. Honorable Serafin E. Camilon, as Judge temporarily presiding over Branch XXV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Sheriff of Pasig, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Violeta Alday and Ernesto Yu were the defendants in a sum of money case decided against them by the Court of First Instance on August 13, 1981. They received a copy of the adverse decision on September 1, 1981. Within the reglementary period, on September 4, 1981, they filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a cash appeal bond but did not file a Record on Appeal. Subsequently, on March 25, 1982, the respondent judge issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution. The judge ruled that the petitioners failed to perfect their appeal due to their omission to file the required Record on Appeal, thereby rendering the lower court’s decision final and executory.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of execution despite the timely filing of a notice of appeal and appeal bond, but without a Record on Appeal, in light of the procedural changes introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

RULING

No, the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the effective date and implementation of the procedural law invoked by the petitioners. Petitioners justified their non-filing of a Record on Appeal by citing Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which eliminated that requirement. While the law was approved on August 14, 1981, Section 44 thereof stipulated that its provisions would be carried out pursuant to an Executive Order from the President, with the old courts continuing to function until the reorganization’s completion was officially declared. Furthermore, the law’s constitutionality was under judicial review until upheld by the Supreme Court on March 12, 1982. Consequently, at the time petitioners filed their appeal in September 1981 and when the respondent judge issued the execution order in March 1982, B.P. Blg. 129 was not yet in full force and effect. The governing procedure remained under the former Rules of Court, which mandated the filing of a Record on Appeal to perfect an appeal. The judge’s order was therefore legally correct based on the rules applicable at that time.
However, the Supreme Court ultimately set aside the execution order and directed that the appeal be given due course. This final disposition is based on the retroactive application of procedural laws. By the time the Supreme Court resolved this case, the President had issued Executive Order No. 864 on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization complete and the old courts abolished. B.P. Blg. 129 and its Interim Rules were thus in full effect, explicitly abolishing the requirement for a Record on Appeal. Procedural rules, being retrospective in that they apply to pending and undetermined actions, operate for the benefit of petitioners. Their appeal, though imperfect under the old rules, is now deemed perfected under the new, prevailing procedural regime.