G.R. No. L-60; January 30, 1946
LORENZA ASICAN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO QUIRINO, Judge of First Instance of Cavite, and ROMAN CUSTODIO, respondents.

FACTS

On March 18, 1944, respondent Roman Custodio executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of petitioner Lorenza Asican. On April 3, 1944, Custodio filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 159) in the Court of First Instance of Cavite seeking to annul the deed on the ground of duress. On July 10, 1944, the parties submitted a “Stipulation and Petition for Judgment,” whereby Custodio recognized Asican’s ownership of the land, and Asican, in turn, bound herself to pay Custodio’s mortgage debt of P3,500 to a third party, Crispulo Arnaldo. The court rendered judgment in accordance with this stipulation, and it was fully executed.
On April 20, 1945, after the return of American forces, Custodio filed a new complaint (Civil Case No. 4001) in the same court, seeking the annulment of the same March 18, 1944 deed of sale upon the same ground of duress. Asican filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, which was granted by Judge Ambrosio Santos. Subsequently, Judge Antonio Quirino was assigned to the court. Custodio filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, which Judge Quirino granted. His order was based on the allegation that the cause of action in the first case was tainted by enemy influence or duress, as a “Japanese protegee” had threatened to send Custodio to jail if he did not convey the property. Asican’s motion for reconsideration of this order was denied, prompting her to file this petition for certiorari to annul Judge Quirino’s order and reinstate Judge Santos’ order of dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion or an error of jurisdiction in granting the motion for reconsideration and setting aside the order of dismissal based on res judicata.

RULING

The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge had jurisdiction to act on the motion for reconsideration. Any error committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction is an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction, and is reviewable only by appeal, not by certiorari. Furthermore, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the respondent judge’s order. The Court noted that the alleged duress by a Japanese protegee, while apparently referring to the execution of the original contract, was so inseparable from the compromise agreement that merged it that an attack on one could be deemed an attack on the other. During oral arguments, Custodio’s counsel announced his intention to attack the compromise agreement directly in an amended complaint.
The Court clarified that its ruling in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G.R. No. L-5), which upheld the validity of judicial proceedings during the enemy occupation, does not necessarily exclude an exception for proceedings held under actual duress or intimidation. While the Court declined to state a final opinion on the matter without all trial circumstances before it, it deemed it proper, given the public knowledge of the policy of terror and violence during the occupation, to allow some latitude in the pleading and proof of such instances so that relief may be granted in the interest of justice. The case was dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
SEPARATE OPINION (DISSENT):
Justice Ozaeta, with whom Justice Paras concurred, dissented. He argued that the majority opinion did not reflect all essential facts. He detailed that the compromise judgment in the first case was fully executed, with Asican paying Custodio’s debt. Custodio filed the second action without repudiating or offering to return the benefits he received. The dissent emphasized that the motion to dismiss was correctly granted by Judge Santos on the ground of res judicata, as there was identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. It criticized Judge Quirino’s order for making irrelevant dissertations and for being based on vague surmises rather than the specific facts and issues of the case. The dissent pointed out that Custodio, in his answer, expressly stated that “the institution of civil case No. 159… is not in issue,” making no claim that the case itself was affected by terror or violence. It concluded that the majority countenanced an unfair act by Custodio and permitted a mockery of judicial proceedings. The dissent voted to annul Judge Quirino’s order and reinstate that of Judge Santos.