G.R. No. L-59981 November 28, 1988
SALVADOR SAPUGAY, petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD CAPUS BOBIS, et al., and HON. CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Salvador Sapugay filed a complaint to annul the sale of a free patent land executed by his parents during his minority to respondents Natividad Capus Bobis and her late spouse, alleging a violation of Section 124 of the Public Land Act ( Commonwealth Act No. 141 ). He alternatively prayed for redemption, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, in their answer, raised affirmative defenses including lack of cause of action, prescription, and indefeasibility of title.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to forego further pre-trial and instead hold a preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative defenses, particularly on whether the complaint stated a cause of action and whether it had prescribed. They further agreed to submit memoranda with documentary evidence on these points, after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The trial court subsequently rendered a decision dismissing the case, finding no violation of Sections 118 or 119 of the Public Land Act as the sale occurred beyond the five-year prohibition period.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by deciding the case on an issue—specifically, the application of Sections 118 and 119 of the Public Land Act—outside the scope of the issues agreed upon by the parties during pre-trial.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner’s contention that the issues were limited solely to the existence of a cause of action and prescription is unfounded. A proper reading of the pre-trial order reveals that the parties agreed to a preliminary hearing on the “special and affirmative defenses contained in defendant’s answer.” These defenses, as enumerated in the answer, inherently included the argument that the purchase was lawful and complied with the Public Land Act, thereby placing the applicability of Sections 118 and 119 squarely within the scope of the agreed-upon preliminary hearing. The trial court’s determination that no violation of these sections occurred was a logical and necessary resolution of the affirmative defense that the sale was legal.
Furthermore, the Court affirmed the dismissal on the independent and conclusive ground of prescription, which was explicitly one of the agreed issues. The Court clarified that the saving clause for minors under the old Code of Civil Procedure ( Act No. 190 ) did not apply. The governing law was Article 1108(1) of the New Civil Code, which states that prescription runs against minors who have parents, guardians, or legal representatives. The petitioner admitted his mother was alive during his minority. Consequently, the prescriptive period for his action to redeem the land under Section 119 of the Public Land Act was not tolled, and his right had prescribed. Thus, the trial court’s decision was correct.