G.R. No. 59840 . March 5, 1984.
AMELIA C. CASIBANG, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

FACTS

Amelia C. Casibang, a permanent budget examiner in the Philippine Tobacco Administration (PTA), was separated from service in 1970 when the PTA board abolished her position due to lack of funds. The Civil Service Commission initially sustained the abolition in 1973 but, upon reconsideration in 1977, ordered her reinstatement. The PTA complied, reinstating her effective October 1, 1977. Casibang then claimed back salaries from 1970 to 1977. The PTA board and the Civil Service Commission initially approved the claim, but the PTA later sought its revocation. Following an opinion from the Government Corporate Counsel, Casibang and the PTA agreed on a compromise: she was paid three years’ net back salaries without prejudice to her appeal for the full amount.
The Civil Service Commission maintained that she was entitled to full back salaries. However, the Commission on Audit (COA), in Opinion No. 311 dated January 29, 1981, ruled that her back salaries could not be charged against PTA funds and later questioned the legality of the three-year payment, directing a refund. Casibang received the PTA’s demand letter for refund on January 14, 1982. Fifty-three days later, on March 9, 1982, she filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the COA opinions.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on time to challenge the decision of the Commission on Audit.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of statutory appeal periods. Section 50 of the Government Auditing Code (P.D. No. 1445) explicitly provides that a decision of the COA may be appealed to the Supreme Court within a reglementary period of thirty days from notice. The Court found that Casibang received notice of the COA’s adverse decision via the PTA’s demand letter on January 14, 1982. Her petition, filed on March 9, 1982, was clearly fifty-three days later, well beyond the 30-day deadline. The Court noted that the petition was erroneously given due course based on a misrepresentation by her counsel regarding the date of receipt, a fact uncontroverted by petitioner. Jurisprudence establishes that failure to appeal a COA (or formerly Auditor General) decision within the statutory period renders it final and unappealable, constituting a bar to judicial review. Furthermore, the ancillary remedy of mandamus was deemed unavailing because the COA’s duty to adjudicate claims involves discretion and is not ministerial. Consequently, the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the belated petition on its merits.