GR L 59783; (December, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-59783 December 1, 1987
DOMINADOR R. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Br. XXXI, and CHARITO MALLARI, respondents.
FACTS
In 1973, petitioner Dominador R. Miranda verbally leased an apartment unit to private respondent Charito Mallari for a monthly rental, later increased to P242.00. The agreement was silent on the lease duration. In 1979, Miranda demanded that Mallari vacate the premises by September 1, 1979, as his married son and family, having no other dwelling, needed the unit. Mallari refused to leave. Miranda filed an ejectment complaint in the City Court, which ruled against him, holding the verbal lease had no definite period and thus had not expired. The Court of First Instance, on appeal, affirmed this decision, interpreting that Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 (BP 25) suspended the application of Article 1687 of the Civil Code, thereby preventing the lease from being considered terminable on a month-to-month basis.
ISSUE
Whether a verbal lease with monthly rentals may be terminated by notice at the end of any month for the lessor’s personal need under Section 5(c) of BP 25, thereby justifying judicial ejectment.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. The legal logic is clear: Section 6 of BP 25 suspended only Article 1673 of the Civil Code (regarding judicial ejectment upon lease expiration), not Article 1687 (which governs the determination of lease periods). Under Article 1687, when no period is fixed and rent is paid monthly, the lease is deemed to be from month to month. Consequently, such a lease expires at the end of each month and can be terminated by proper notice. The Court, citing Rivera v. Florendo, held that to rule otherwise would render Section 5(c) of BP 25—which allows ejectment for the lessor’s personal need—illusory for verbal month-to-month leases. This is because the lessor could never eject the tenant, as the lease would never technically expire during BP 25’s effectivity, despite a pressing statutory ground. The need of Miranda’s son is a valid ground under Section 5(c). Therefore, the notice to vacate effectively terminated the lease at the month’s end, making the subsequent judicial ejectment proper.