GR L 59330; (June, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-59330 June 28, 1983
MANUEL GUANZON, petitioner, vs. HON. PATERNO D. MONTESCLAROS, Presiding Judge, City Court of Cebu, FERDINAND BRIONES and ROSARIO BRIONES, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents, the Briones spouses, filed an ejectment case against petitioner Manuel Guanzon in the City Court of Cebu. After being served with summons, Guanzon asked for and was granted an extension to file an answer. He failed to file it, leading the court to declare him in default. The court then proceeded to hear the case ex parte and rendered a judgment against him. Guanzon was not furnished a copy of this default judgment but obtained one after being served with a writ of execution.
Upon obtaining the decision, Guanzon filed a motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment. The City Court denied this motion and subsequent motions for reconsideration. Instead of appealing these orders of denial to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), Guanzon filed a petition for certiorari in that same CFI, seeking to quash the writ of execution and set aside the default judgment. The CFI dismissed his certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari, given the availability of the remedy of appeal.
RULING
Yes, the dismissal was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the CFI’s decision, reiterating the fundamental rule that the special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. It will not lie where an appeal is an available and adequate remedy. The legal logic is clear: the orderly administration of justice requires that the hierarchy of remedies be observed. Certiorari is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal.
In this case, a specific remedy was available to Guanzon. Following the precedent in Luzon Rubber and Manufacturing, Co. vs. Estaris, a defendant declared in default by an inferior court who seeks to regain his standing must first file a motion to set aside the order of default. If such a motion is denied, the defendant has the right to appeal that specific order of denial to the Court of First Instance. Guanzon filed the necessary motion, but when it was denied, he bypassed the available appeal and improperly resorted to certiorari. His failure to exhaust this plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of appeal barred his certiorari action. The Court emphasized that the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment is a final order that is appealable, and the appeal from such an order is the proper procedural vehicle, not certiorari.