GR L 5832; (February, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5832; February 27, 1953
PAZ FIRMEZA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EVO SANTIAGO DAVID, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On February 15, 1949, Paz Firmesa filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to recover a parcel of land with improvements in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, from Evo Santiago David. She alleged ownership through a registered certificate of title and possession until January 7, 1948, when the defendant, by force and intimidation, occupied the premises and harvested its products thereafter. The defendant’s answer alleged fraud in the plaintiff’s acquisition of the certificate and asserted his own ownership through inheritance. During the hearing, the defendant orally questioned the court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the complaint alleged a case of forcible entry and detainer, which should be within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. Judge Francisco Arellano overruled the objection, noting the seizure occurred more than one year before the complaint was filed. After a hearing, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the delivery of the property and payment of damages. The defendant appealed, insisting solely on the jurisdictional issue.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complaint, or whether it was a forcible entry and detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, holding that it had proper jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the action was not one for forcible entry and detainer but an ordinary civil action to recover possession (accion publiciana), cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Since the forcible occupation began on January 7, 1948, and the complaint was filed on February 15, 1949, more than one year had elapsed from the deprivation of possession. Under Rule 72, section 1, a forcible entry and detainer action must be brought within one year. The Court explained the three kinds of actions for recovery of possession: (1) summary action for forcible entry or detainer (accion interdictal), for recovery of physical possession only, brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) accion publiciana, for recovery of the right to possess, a plenary action in the Court of First Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion, for recovery of ownership, also in the Court of First Instance. The Judiciary Act of 1948 did not alter the principle that when deprivation of possession lasts more than one year, the action to recover falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance. The appealed decision was affirmed with costs against the appellant.
