G.R. No. L-57839 June 27, 1988
ROBERT YOUNG, for himself and as Legal Representative of the deceased MARTIN YOUNG, and RICHARD YOUNG, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JULIO A. SULIT, JR., Associate Commissioner, and THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COMMISSION EN BANC, GIMENEZ STOCK BROKERAGE & CO., INC., ARTHUR F. GIMENEZ, JOSE A. GIMENEZ, ROSE F. GIMENEZ, and GEORGE F. GIMENEZ, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Robert, Martin, and Richard Young filed complaints with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Gimenez Stock Brokerage & Co., Inc., alleging illegal disposal of their stocks and other malpractices, docketed as SEC Case No. 1763. The SEC Hearing Officer rendered a decision ordering the brokerage to pay substantial monetary awards to each petitioner, covering sales proceeds, price differences, illegal charges, and damages. A copy of this decision was served on the brokerage’s counsel on May 20, 1981. The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but petitioners contested its timeliness, claiming it was filed only on June 25, 1981, and thus beyond the reglementary period.
Asserting that the decision had become final and executory, petitioners secured a writ of execution from the Hearing Officer. In response, private respondents, through new counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal to the SEC En Banc and a Petition to Quash the Writ of Execution. Acting on this petition, respondent Associate Commissioner Julio A. Sulit, Jr. issued an order dated August 20, 1981, enjoining the sheriff from enforcing the writ and withdrawing the garnishment on the brokerage’s funds, setting the matter for hearing. Petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Associate Commissioner Sulit committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the interlocutory order of August 20, 1981, which suspended the enforcement of the writ of execution.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as premature. The Court ruled that the order in question was an interlocutory order—it did not definitively settle the merits of the case or terminate the proceedings. The legal logic is that interlocutory orders, which address incidental matters during the pendency of a case, are generally not subject to immediate review via certiorari. Petitioners should have first awaited the SEC En Banc’s resolution on the disputed motion for reconsideration and the propriety of the appeal before seeking Supreme Court intervention. By filing the petition prematurely, petitioners bypassed the available administrative remedy.
Furthermore, the Court held that for a writ of certiorari to issue, there must be a showing of grave abuse of discretion, defined as a capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power. The act of setting the petition to quash for hearing demonstrated a judicial process, not an arbitrary one. The Supreme Court emphasized that allowing immediate appeals from every interlocutory order would lead to interminable litigation and clog court dockets. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the SEC for further proceedings, and the petition was denied.