GR L 5699; (November, 1910) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5699
APOLINARIO TAÑIDO, as administratrix of the intestate estate of the Chinaman Jose Martinez, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIA JUMAUAN, ET AL., defendants.ANTONIA JUMAUAN, appellant.
November 19, 1910
FACTS: Prudencio Velez, during his lifetime and marriage to Antonia Jumauan, owed Jose Martinez P983. After Velez’s death, his father Mariano Velez and widow Antonia Jumauan, as his sole heirs, agreed to deed several properties to Martinez in payment of the debt. Antonia Jumauan initially refused to sign the deed, expressing fears of being left without means of support. Jose Martinez then promised to return some of the property to her if she signed the deed. Relying on this promise, Antonia signed the deed of transfer on July 3, 1901 (or July 1910 as stated in the complaint). Martinez subsequently fulfilled his promise by executing another instrument (Exhibit 1) on August 2, 1910, returning a house, five parcels of land, and a fishery site to Antonia.
Apolinario Tañido, as administratrix of Martinez’s estate, later filed a complaint seeking to recover these properties from Antonia Jumauan, alleging she illegally detained them and that they rightfully belonged to Martinez’s estate. The Court of First Instance of Misamis sentenced Antonia Jumauan to return certain properties to Tañido. Antonia Jumauan appealed, contending that the properties returned to her by Martinez were not part of the properties due to the estate.
ISSUE: Was the return of certain properties by Jose Martinez to Antonia Jumauan an act of donation, or was it the fulfillment of a valid condition precedent that entitled Jumauan to retain those properties?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Antonia Jumauan, reversing the lower court’s decision in part. The Court held that the act of Jose Martinez in returning the house, five parcels of land, and the fishery site to Antonia Jumauan was not a gift or donation. Instead, it was the fulfillment of a condition precedent agreed upon between the contracting parties (Martinez and Jumauan) for the perfection of the contract of deed.
The Court reasoned that Antonia Jumauan’s agreement to sign the deed of transfer was contingent upon Martinez’s promise to return a portion of the properties. This promise, made by Martinez out of compassion and as a condition for Jumauan’s signature, constituted a renunciation of a part of his credit, which is permissible under Article 1255 of the Civil Code (freedom to establish conditions not contrary to law, morals, or public order). The Court emphasized that the intention of the parties, as evidenced by their contemporaneous and subsequent acts (Article 1282, Civil Code), clearly showed that Martinez’s return of the property was in compliance with a stipulated condition, not an act of mere liberality.
Therefore, Antonia Jumauan was entitled to hold, as owner, the house, the five parcels of land, and the fishery site described in the instrument Exhibit 1. However, she was sentenced to return lands designated in the lower court judgment as Nos. 7 and 8, as these were not included in the properties returned to her under Exhibit 1.
