G.R. No. L-56960 January 28, 1988
ELISEA G. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and CLARENCE PIMENTEL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Elisea Roxas executed a general power of attorney authorizing Edgardo Jose to sell her real property. Acting under this authority, Jose sold Roxas’s house and lot to respondent Clarence Pimentel. The consideration was partly in cash and partly through the exchange of Pimentel’s own property. Upon her return to the Philippines, Roxas revoked the power of attorney and later filed a suit to annul the sale, alleging Jose lacked authority. The trial court ruled in favor of Roxas, annulling the sale, ordering the cancellation of Pimentel’s title, and directing him to vacate the property. Pimentel appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals.
Subsequently, Roxas filed a motion for execution pending appeal of the trial court’s judgment. The trial court granted the motion, ordering immediate execution specifically for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of title, and delivery of possession to Roxas. It justified the order by citing Roxas’s lack of a house, causing her humiliation and inconvenience, and by characterizing Pimentel’s appeal as merely pro-forma and dilatory. The trial court required Roxas to post a bond. Pimentel challenged this order via a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision setting aside the order for execution pending appeal. The legal logic centers on the strict requirements of Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which permits execution pending appeal only for “good reasons” stated in a special order. The Court clarified that such “good reasons” must be superior circumstances demanding urgency, outweighing the injury or damage to the adverse party, and must constitute a compelling justification for depriving a party of the right to a stay of execution during appeal.
The trial court’s cited reasons were insufficient. First, the claim that Pimentel’s appeal was pro-forma and dilatory was a grave error, as an appeal is a matter of right, and its merits are for the appellate court to determine. Second, Roxas’s alleged personal inconvenience and lack of housing, while unfortunate, did not constitute the exceptional and compelling circumstance required by law to override the fundamental rule that execution should await the finality of judgment. The filing of a bond does not cure the absence of such good reasons. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the immediate execution would effectively pre-judge the appeal and prematurely transfer ownership and possession based on a non-final decision, thereby causing irreparable injury to Pimentel, the current registered owner and possessor. Therefore, the trial court’s order constituted grave abuse of discretion.