GR L 55808; (August, 1984) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-55808 August 28, 1984
LEANDRO ALAZAS, petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, GUMERCINDO JIMENEZ, Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Cebu, and ROSARIO MERCADER, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Rosario Mercader filed a complaint for recovery of property and damages with replevin against petitioner Leandro Alazas, alleging he illegally seized personal properties from her tour office. The trial court ruled in Mercader’s favor, ordering Alazas to return specific items and pay monetary awards. Alazas filed a notice of appeal. Mercader moved for execution pending appeal. The trial court initially granted this motion ex parte, but the Court of Appeals annulled that order due to lack of notice to the adverse party, a violation of Section 2, Rule 39. Subsequently, Mercader re-set the motion for hearing. After a hearing where both parties were heard, the trial court again granted execution pending appeal, issuing the corresponding writs.
The trial court justified execution pending appeal by stating the appeal was “clearly frivolous and dilatory” and that delay would cause Mercader grave and irreparable damage. The execution was aggressively implemented, with properties seized and notices for public auction issued rapidly. Alazas challenged these acts, arguing the trial court disregarded due process and the appellate court’s prior annulment, and exhibited bias by pre-judging the appeal as frivolous without clear basis.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal and in the conduct of its implementation.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court found grave abuse of discretion and improper judicial conduct. The legal logic centers on the stringent requirements for execution pending appeal under Rule 39. Such execution is an exception, permissible only for good reasons stated in a special order. The trial court’s cited reason—that the appeal was frivolous and dilatory—lacked evidentiary support. The Court noted that most properties were already in Mercader’s possession via the earlier replevin writ, undermining the claim of “irreparable damage.” Furthermore, the judge’s conduct violated due process and created an appearance of impropriety. The Court emphasized that a judge’s behavior must be beyond reproach. The haste in issuing the writ, the failure to properly address Alazas’s opposition regarding the re-filing of the motion, and the aggressive enforcement collectively demonstrated not just an error in judgment but a capricious and whimsical exercise of power equivalent to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court set aside the execution orders, directed the trial court to give due course to the appeal, and censured the respondent judge.