G.R. No. L-5555 March 25, 1953
EUGENIO REYES Y OTRA, recurrentes-apelantes, vs. E JUEZ PABLO G. CORNISTA, ETC. Y OTRO, recurridos-apelados.

FACTS

On May 28, 1951, the municipal government of Santa Cruz, Laguna, filed a complaint in the justice of the peace court of said municipality against Eugenio Reyes and Iluminada Katindig (Civil Case No. 69) for the collection of P1,164, representing unpaid license taxes from the defendants as owners of the Selecta Hotel and Restaurant. The defendants filed their answer with special defenses and a counterclaim against the municipality. During the hearing, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on (a) Municipal Resolution No. 35-A, approved by the provincial board of Laguna on August 22, 1951, through Resolution No. 839, and (b) Resolution No. 70 of the municipal board of Santa Cruz. Municipal Resolution No. 35-A stated that the municipal council “requests the Hon. Justice of the Peace of Santa Cruz to dismiss Civil Case No. 69… on the ground that the municipal council of Santa Cruz was not authorized to file the complaint.” Resolution No. 70, dated December 10, 1949, resolved “to condone as it hereby condones whatever amount in the form of back taxes that may be found due from the owner of the Selecta Hotel.” The justice of the peace denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the defendants filed a petition for certiorari with mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Laguna against the Justice of the Peace of Santa Cruz and Auxiliary Fiscal Nestor B. Alampay. The respondents were ordered to answer, and Alampay filed his answer. On December 18, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Laguna issued an order dismissing the petition for certiorari. Against this order, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether Municipal Resolution No. 35-A, which requested the dismissal of the tax collection case, effectively withdrew the authority of the provincial fiscal (or his delegate) to represent the municipal government in the suit.
2. Whether Municipal Resolution No. 70, which condoned the back taxes, is valid and binding, thereby justifying the dismissal of the collection case.
3. Whether the Court of First Instance acted correctly in dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus.

RULING

1. NO. The municipal council does not constitute the entire government of the municipality; it is merely the legislative branch of the municipal government. The provincial fiscal or his delegates, under Section 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code, are the legal representatives in civil cases for the Government of the Philippines and the provincial and municipal governments. This provision of a general law cannot be amended by a municipal council resolution. Therefore, Resolution No. 35-A could not divest the provincial fiscal or his delegate of the authority to appear for the municipal government of Santa Cruz. The municipal council exceeded its powers and invaded the sphere of action of the provincial treasurer, who is charged with the collection of taxes throughout the province, including municipal taxes (Sections 2089[b] and 2629[g], Revised Administrative Code). The municipal corporation, not the council alone, has the right to sue and be sued. The council is only a part of the municipal government.
2. NO. The power to levy taxes is not inherent in municipal corporations; it must be expressly conferred by law. This principle applies equally to license and occupation taxes. Municipalities have no implied power of taxation. More importantly, the law has not conferred upon municipal councils the power to condone taxes already due and unpaid. On the contrary, Section 2309 of the Municipal Law provides that an existing municipal license tax shall only be subject to alteration by an ordinance approved prior to the 15th of December of any year for the following year. This means ordinances imposing license taxes must look to the future only. Nowhere is the council granted the power to condone taxes previously accrued. Therefore, Resolution No. 70, which condoned the defendants’ obligation to pay the license taxes for their hotel and restaurant, is null and void.
3. YES. The justice of the peace was justified in denying the motion to dismiss as it was without legal basis. Regarding the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing the petition for certiorari with mandamus without stating its reasons, while the petitioners correctly argue that this was not in accordance with the Constitution (as the court should have stated its reasons), this omission is not a ground for granting their petition. The Court of First Instance could not compel the justice of the peace to dismiss the complaint because (a) the motion to dismiss lacked legal foundation, and (b) the remedy of certiorari and mandamus was inappropriate. These writs can only be used when, in the ordinary course of procedure, the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. In the case before the Justice of the Peace Court of Santa Cruz, the defendants could have appealed if a judgment had been rendered against them. The petition is denied. The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs.