GR L 55212; (September, 1983) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-55212, September 2, 1983
SATURNINO DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Et Al., Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Saturnino Domingo, a Lieutenant Colonel in the AFP, was arrested on August 7, 1979, and detained pursuant to an Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) issued by the Minister of National Defense. For over a year, no formal charges were filed against him. On October 7, 1980, he filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending his detention was illegal due to a denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as no preliminary investigation or criminal charges had been instituted. During the pendency of the petition, a preliminary investigation was conducted by military authorities. On February 10, 1981, it was revealed that a prima facie case had been found, and a general court-martial was convened to try him for desertion, illegal disposition of government property, and infidelity in the custody of documents. The petitioner subsequently argued that the right to prosecute him had prescribed.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial was violated, warranting his release via habeas corpus, and subsidiarily, whether the crimes charged had prescribed.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. On the speedy trial claim, the Court ruled that the right is necessarily relative and must be weighed considering the circumstances of each case. The delay from his arrest in August 1979 until the filing of charges in early 1981 was not deemed unreasonable or oppressive. The Court noted the complexity of the case, involving a high-ranking military officer and multiple serious charges requiring extensive investigation. The petitioner’s own procedural actions, including filing various motions, also contributed to the timeline. The Court found no deliberate attempt by the state to delay the proceedings to prejudice the petitioner.
Regarding prescription, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations for the offenses was three years. The period is interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings, which, for court-martial cases, commences upon arraignment. The petitioner was arraigned on February 25, 1981. Since all alleged offenses were committed within three years prior to that date, the statutory period had not lapsed. The Court rejected the petitioner’s alternative argument that prescription should be counted from his arrest, noting that his own prior pleadings conceded that the filing of charges suspended the prescriptive period. Consequently, his continued detention for trial was lawful.