GR L 5441; (November, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5441. November 29, 1952.
YU PHI KHIM, petitioner, vs. TENG GIOK YAN and JUDGE FIDEL IBAÑEZ, ETC., respondents.
FACTS
In October 1950, the Manila municipal court rendered a judgment in favor of Yu Phi Khim against Teng Giok Yan, ordering the latter to vacate the premises on Ilaya Street, Manila, pay unpaid rentals, and pay monthly rentals of P440 thereafter, plus damages and attorney’s fees. Teng Giok Yan appealed to the Court of First Instance. During the pendency of the appeal, he deposited the monthly rentals in court. On December 10, 1951, Yu Phi Khim filed a motion for execution of the judgment, alleging that Teng Giok Yan failed to pay the rents “in advance on or before the fifth day of each month” as stipulated in their lease contract. The motion was denied. Yu Phi Khim then filed a petition for mandamus, citing the fact that the rental for December 1951 was deposited on the sixth day of that month. He invoked Rule 72, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that execution shall issue unless the defendant, during the pendency of the appeal, pays the rent due “under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist.” Respondent Teng Giok Yan, in his answer, denied that the contract contained such a stipulation regarding the time of payment.
ISSUE
Whether execution of the municipal court’s judgment should issue based on the alleged failure of the defendant to pay the monthly rental strictly “on or before the fifth day of each month” as required under the purported lease contract, considering the provisions of Rule 72, Section 8.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus. The Court held that under Rule 72, Section 8, the condition for staying execution during appeal is that the defendant pays the rent due “under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal court to exist.” The judgment of the Manila municipal court in this case did not declare that a contract of lease existed between the parties, nor did it specify any terms regarding the time of payment (e.g., that rents were payable within the first five days of the month in advance). Since the judgment lacked such specific findings, the case falls under the portion of the rule covering “the absence of a contract,” which requires the defendant to pay, on or before the tenth day of each month, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises as determined by the judgment. The Court emphasized that the ten-day period applies when the judgment does not make findings as to the existence or terms of the contract, and the Court of First Instance cannot, in a motion for execution, receive evidence to determine such terms. Additionally, the Court noted that waiver could be imputed to the petitioner, as monthly payments from January to December 1951 had been made after the fifth day without protest until December 10, 1951. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.