GR L 53914; (September, 1984) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-53914 September 30, 1984
RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. CONRADO LINDO and THE HONORABLE JUDGE PABLO D. SUAREZ, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rodolfo de Leon, the proclaimed and incumbent Mayor of Ternate, Cavite, filed this petition against respondent Conrado Lindo, his rival candidate, and Judge Pablo Suarez. The controversy stemmed from the January 30, 1980, local elections. De Leon, the KBL official candidate, was proclaimed winner, assumed office, and discharged his duties. Lindo, a KBL member who ran as an independent candidate, initially faced a disqualification case for turncoatism, which the Commission on Elections dismissed—a dismissal affirmed by the Supreme Court in a prior decision.
Subsequently, respondent Judge Suarez issued an order granting Lindo a “reasonable period of time” to file an election protest, despite the lapse of the statutory 10-day period from proclamation prescribed by the 1978 Election Code. Later, the same judge issued another order proclaiming Lindo as the duly elected mayor, declaring de Leon’s earlier proclamation null, and restraining de Leon from performing his duties. De Leon assailed these orders for violating the mandatory 10-day filing period and for the judge’s act of proclaiming a new winner amidst a pending protest.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) granting a reasonable extension to file an election protest beyond the statutory period, and (2) proclaiming a new winner and ousting the incumbent mayor during the pendency of the protest.
RULING
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. It sustained the respondent Judge’s grant of an additional period to file the election protest but nullified the order proclaiming Lindo as mayor and ousting de Leon.
On the first issue, the Court, invoking its equitable powers, ruled that a strict application of the 10-day statutory period could lead to injustice by absolutely barring a determination of the true will of the electorate. Citing precedents like Venezuela v. COMELEC, the Court has consistently allowed a reasonable period, usually ten days, for filing protests in similar contexts to serve the higher interest of justice. Since the protest had already been filed and was being acted upon, it would be inequitable to dismiss it on a purely technical ground at that stage.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Lindo as the winner and ejecting de Leon from office. The sole purpose of an election protest is to determine who obtained the plurality of legal votes. The court hearing the protest has no jurisdiction to issue a mid-protest proclamation; its authority is limited to rendering a final decision after a full hearing on the merits. Therefore, de Leon, as the proclaimed and incumbent official, is entitled to remain in office until a final judicial declaration of Lindo’s victory. The temporary restraining order against Lindo was made permanent, and the case was remanded for continuation of the election protest.
