G.R. No. L-53776 March 18, 1988
Silvestre Caniza, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Jaime Agloro, Presiding Judge, Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS

On March 20, 1974, an Information for falsification of public documents allegedly committed on November 5, 1968, was filed against petitioner Silvestre Caniza. He filed a Motion to Quash, which the trial court granted in an Order dated November 27, 1974, dismissing the case. The Fiscal filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on April 3, 1975. Subsequently, on June 13, 1979, a second Information charging Caniza with substantially the same offense was filed. Caniza again moved to quash, arguing prescription, double jeopardy, and failure of the information to charge an offense. The respondent judge denied the motion. Caniza then filed this Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the offense charged had already prescribed; (2) whether the filing of the second Information placed the accused in double jeopardy; and (3) whether the allegations in the second Information constitute an offense.

RULING

The Petition must fail. On the issue of prescription, the crime of falsification by a private individual prescribes in ten years. The period commenced on the date of the alleged offense, November 5, 1968. It was interrupted by the filing of the first Information on March 20, 1974. The period began to run again only after the proceedings were finally terminated, which was upon the denial of the Fiscal’s Motion for Reconsideration on April 3, 1975. The second Information was filed on June 13, 1979. The total elapsed time, excluding the period during which the proceedings were pending, was only nine years, six months, and twenty-eight days, which is within the ten-year prescriptive period. The Court held that the filing of a motion for reconsideration continues the suspension of the prescriptive period until the proceedings are terminated beyond reconsideration.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the defense cannot be successfully invoked. One of the essential requisites for double jeopardy is that the first case must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. In this case, the first Information was dismissed upon the Motion to Quash filed by the petitioner himself. A dismissal upon the motion of, or with the express consent of, the accused constitutes a waiver of the right to plead double jeopardy, and another prosecution for the same offense is not barred.
Finally, the Court found that the allegations in the second Information sufficiently charged an offense. The Information alleged that the petitioner, as counsel and co-owner, prepared and filed a falsified motion for reinvestigation containing untruthful statements regarding ownership of a building, which resulted in the acquittal of his co-accused. These allegations, if proven, constitute the crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. Therefore, the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Quash.