G.R. No. L-5296; May 29, 1953
Gregorio Enriquez, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Donato Perez, as administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased spouses Santiago Ruste Tan Diu and Cecilia Columbres, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Gregorio Enriquez, filed Civil Case No. 149 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 19, 1948, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage against the defendant, Donato Perez, as administrator of an intestate estate. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on December 1, 1948, on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity to sue (due to an unregistered assignment of the mortgage credit) and that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations (more than ten years having elapsed since the accrual of the action on the last mortgage). The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint by order dated January 13, 1949. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking to amend the complaint to cure the defects, but this was denied by order dated February 2, 1949. The plaintiff did not appeal these orders. Instead, on September 19, 1949, the plaintiff filed a second complaint, Civil Case No. 187, against the same defendant for the same foreclosure. The defendant moved to dismiss this second case on the ground of res judicata. The court, by order dated March 31, 1950, dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 187 on the ground of res judicata. The plaintiff appealed this order.

ISSUE

Whether the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 149 constitutes res judicata, thereby barring the subsequent complaint in Civil Case No. 187.

RULING

Yes, the order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 149 operates as res judicata, barring the subsequent action. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order dismissing Civil Case No. 187. The Court held that the parties, subject matter, and cause of action in both cases were the same. The plaintiff’s attempt to differentiate the second complaint by alleging new facts—such as the registration of the assignment and partial payments made in 1941 which allegedly constituted a new promise to pay—was unavailing. These new allegations could have been presented via an amendment in the first case, but the plaintiff chose not to appeal the denial of his motion to amend. Allowing a new complaint based on these facts would permit the splitting of claims. Furthermore, the dismissal in the first case was an adjudication on the merits. Although one ground for dismissal was lack of capacity to sue, the motion was also based on the statute of limitations, and the court sustained both grounds. Under Section 4, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, such a dismissal (not for lack of jurisdiction) operates as an adjudication upon the merits. Therefore, the final order in Civil Case No. 149 barred the subsequent filing of Civil Case No. 187.