G.R. No. L-5267 October 27, 1953
LUZ HERMOSA, as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Fernando Hermosa, Sr., and FERNANDO HERMOSA, JR., petitioners, vs. EPIFANIO M. LONGARA, respondent.

FACTS

This is an appeal by certiorari against a decision of the Court of Appeals approving certain claims by Epifanio M. Longara against the intestate estate of Fernando Hermosa, Sr. The claims are: (1) P2,341.41 for credit advances made to the intestate from 1932 to 1944; (2) P12,924.12 for advances made to his son Francisco Hermosa; and (3) P3,772 for advances made to his grandson, Fernando Hermosa, Jr., from 1945 to 1947, after the intestate’s death in December 1944. The Court of Appeals found that the intestate requested these credit advances for himself and his family “on condition that their payment should be made by Fernando Hermosa, Sr. as soon as he receive funds derived from the sale of his property in Spain.” The claimant testified, without opposition, that the advances were “payable as soon as Fernando Hermosa, Sr.’s property in Spain was sold and he receive money derived from the sale.” The Court of Appeals held payment became due only when the administratrix received P20,000 from the sale of the Spanish property, which occurred after probate court authorization in October 1947. The claim was filed on October 2, 1948.

ISSUE

1. Whether the obligation, conditioned on payment “as soon as he receives funds derived from the sale of his property in Spain,” is a condicion potestativa (depending exclusively on the debtor’s will) and thus null and void under Article 1115 of the old Civil Code.
2. Whether the claims are barred by prescription.
3. Whether the claim for advances made to the grandson after the intestate’s death is valid.

RULING

1. On the Nature of the Condition: The Supreme Court held the condition is not a purely potestative one depending solely on the debtor’s will, but a mixed condition depending partly on the debtor’s will and partly on chance (the presence of a buyer willing to purchase under the debtor’s terms). The condition implies the intestate had decided to sell, and payment was contingent on the sale’s consummation and receipt of proceeds. If the intestate voluntarily prevented the sale, the condition would be deemed complied with under Article 1119 of the old Civil Code. Thus, the obligation is governed by the second sentence of Article 1115 and is a valid suspensive condition. Upon the happening of the condition (sale and receipt of funds), the debt became immediately due and demandable, retroacting to the contract’s date. The action accrued only when the money became available, so the claim has not prescribed.
2. On Prescription and Statute of Non-Claims: The Court declined to consider the statute of non-claims issue as it was not raised in the lower courts.
3. On the Claim for Advances to the Grandson: The Court reversed the allowance of the P3,772 claim for advances made to the grandson after the intestate’s death. The obligation to furnish support is personal and extinguished upon death under Article 150 of the old Civil Code. Also, an agent’s authority terminates upon the principal’s death under Article 1732. Thus, any authorization to furnish necessaries could not extend beyond the intestate’s death.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it approves the claims of P2,341.41 and P12,924.12, and reversed as to the claim of P3,772. No costs.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Chief Justice Paras concurred in reversing the P3,772 claim but dissented regarding the other claims. He argued the condition was potestative and null, as the sale depended solely on the debtor’s will, with no binding terms agreed upon. Since no sale occurred during the debtor’s lifetime, the debt became immediately demandable or payable within a court-fixed term, and the action had prescribed after ten years.