GR L 5129; (January, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5129; January 30, 1953
Miguela Aragon, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Conrado Aragon, et al., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
In a prior partition case (Civil Case No. 578), plaintiff-appellant Miguela Aragon was adjudged a portion of land as her share. Pursuant to a writ of execution, the provincial sheriff delivered possession of this land to Miguela after ousting defendants-appellees Conrado Aragon and Maximo Aragon on December 4 and 18, 1950, respectively. Subsequently, on or about January 6, 1951, Conrado and Maximo reentered the land and gathered 800 coconuts, executing acts of ownership and possession. Miguela Aragon complained to the court, alleging this act violated Section 3(h) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The court initially issued an order for the defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. However, a different judge later dismissed the complaint without taking evidence, declaring that Miguela’s remedy was to file a complaint for theft or robbery instead.
ISSUE
Whether the act of defendants-appellees in reentering the land and gathering coconuts, after having been dispossessed by virtue of a court judgment and writ of execution, constitutes contempt of court under Section 3(h) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the acts complained of constitute contempt under Section 3(h) of Rule 64. The provision specifically penalizes the act of a person who, after being dispossessed by court judgment or process, reenters the property to execute acts of ownership or possession, thereby disturbing the possession of the adjudged owner. The Court cited Chief Justice Moran’s commentary, which states that such reentry constitutes contempt without any time limit, applying when possession has been given by an officer under a writ. This ruling is supported by the analogous case of Azotes vs. Blanco. The Court further held that the fact the same act may also constitute a violation of the Revised Penal Code (e.g., theft) does not preclude punishment for contempt, as the two sanctions are different in intent and can coexist, citing Re Chapman, 166 U.S., 661. The order of dismissal was revoked, and the case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.