G.R. No. L-51278 May 9, 1988
HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, CFI of Davao and LUIS TAN alias CHEN YEH-AN, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Luis Tan filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of Dominga Garcia, alleging he was her sole heir to a parcel of land in Davao City possessed by petitioners, the Heirs of Ramon Pizarro, Sr. Petitioners opposed, claiming their father acquired half of the lot via a 1966 sale from Vicente Tan. The parties entered into a compromise approved by the Court of First Instance (CFI) on December 6, 1977, whereby petitioners withdrew their opposition. Subsequently, the court issued an order on March 27, 1978, requiring creditors’ claims to be filed within six months from the first publication of notice on March 30, 1978. Petitioners received a copy of this order on March 28, 1978.
On March 5 and 29, 1979, petitioners filed monetary claims against Garcia’s estate. Private respondent moved to dismiss these claims as time-barred, having been filed beyond the six-month period set in the 1978 notice. The CFI, in its Order of June 1, 1979, dismissed the claims for being filed out of time. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The CFI, in an Order dated July 17, 1979, denied due course to this notice, ruling the appeal raised a pure question of law and directing petitioners to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court instead.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the CFI correctly dismissed petitioners’ claims as time-barred under Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. A procedural issue is whether the CFI correctly denied the notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the CFI’s orders. On the substantive issue, the Court held the claims were not time-barred. Section 2, Rule 86 mandates that the notice shall state a filing period of “not more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication.” The CFI’s order setting a period of “within six (6) months” from the first publication was erroneous. The provision establishes an outer limit (twelve months) and a minimum period (six months) for filing, but the court must set a specific deadline within that statutory window. The CFI’s formulation effectively required filing within the first six-month block, which is a misapplication. Petitioners’ claims, filed in March 1979, were within twelve months from the March 30, 1978 publication and were therefore timely.
On the procedural issue, the Court found the CFI’s order directing a petition for review to the Supreme Court was well-taken. The trial court has the competence to determine if an appeal involves a pure question of law. Since the sole issue was the interpretation of Rule 86, a pure legal question, the proper mode of review was indeed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, not an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The orders of June 1 and July 17, 1979, were set aside regarding the barring of the claims.