GR L 5111; (August, 1909) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5111
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE REYES and SEVERO JAVIER, defendants. SEVERO JAVIER, appellant.
August 18, 1909
FACTS:
Defendants Vicente Reyes and Severo Javier were charged with homicide for the death of Pedro Legaspi. The evidence indicated that on the night of August 21, 1908, Javier and Legaspi were engaged in a quarrel, with Legaspi using a club. Vicente Reyes intervened to separate them. Legaspi struck Reyes with the club. Enraged, Reyes seized the club from Legaspi and struck Legaspi twice on the head, inflicting mortal blows from which Legaspi died hours later. While Reyes was striking Legaspi, Severo Javier was holding Legaspi firmly, preventing him from offering serious resistance. The trial court found both defendants guilty. Javier appealed, arguing against his conviction.
ISSUE:
Can Severo Javier be held liable as a principal or accomplice for homicide when he was holding the victim (Pedro Legaspi) during the time his codefendant (Vicente Reyes) suddenly seized a club and inflicted fatal blows, without clear evidence of concerted action or prior agreement to commit the deadly assault?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Severo Javier.
The Court held that while Javier was holding Legaspi when Reyes inflicted the fatal blows, there was no express showing of concerted action or voluntary cooperation between Reyes and Javier leading to the infliction of the fatal blows. Reyes acted wholly on his own initiative, becoming enraged and striking Legaspi suddenly and unexpectedly after being hit by Legaspi’s club. Javier’s act of holding Legaspi was initially to prevent Legaspi from striking him with the club during their own quarrel, not to aid Reyes in his sudden, homicidal attack. The unexpected intervention and actions of Reyes did not provide Javier an opportunity for voluntary cooperation.
Citing United States v. Manayao et al. (4 Phil. Rep., 293), the Court reiterated that a companion cannot be held as a principal or accomplice if there is no concerted action leading to the fatal blow, or if the companion had no reason to believe a deadly attack was to be made on the deceased. Since Reyes’s actions were sudden and taken on his own initiative, and Javier’s holding of Legaspi was not for the purpose of aiding Reyes in inflicting the fatal blows, Javier could not be held liable.
Javier was acquitted of the crime of homicide.