GR L 5070; (December, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5070 December 29, 1952
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO PETILLA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On August 31, 1949, an information charging Pedro Petilla with slight physical injuries was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Gumaca, Quezon. During a joint hearing with another case, the Justice of the Peace found the injuries required more than thirty days to heal, believed it beyond his jurisdiction, and forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance. On December 17, 1949, the provincial fiscal amended the information to charge serious physical injuries and requested a preliminary investigation. The accused waived preliminary investigation. On February 22, 1950, the accused filed a motion to quash, alleging double jeopardy. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case on February 28, 1950. The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Instead of appealing, the fiscal moved to return the case to the Justice of the Peace for trial on the original information, which was granted. Later, on June 17, 1950, the fiscal asked for provisional dismissal and filed a new information for serious physical injuries in the Court of First Instance (criminal case No. 10758). After preliminary investigation, the accused again moved to quash on July 6, 1951, arguing the case had already been quashed, the order was final, and reviving it encouraged multiplicity of suits. On August 8, 1951, the court sustained the motion and dismissed the case, holding the February 28, 1950 order had become final and executory, and res judicata applied.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the new information (criminal case No. 10758) on the ground of res judicata, due to the finality of its prior order quashing the earlier information.
RULING
Yes, the order appealed from is affirmed. The Court held that the initial order of dismissal dated February 28, 1950, though erroneous in its application of double jeopardy, became final and executory due to the provincial fiscal’s failure to appeal within the prescribed period. The Court explained that the amendment from slight to serious physical injuries, based on a supervening fact (the healing period exceeding thirty days), did not constitute double jeopardy under the doctrine established in People vs. Manolong, which allows a new charge when a new fact supervenes changing the character of the offense. However, the fiscal’s procedural mistake—not appealing the erroneous dismissal order and instead filing a new information for the same offense—rendered that order binding and conclusive under the principle of res judicata. Thus, the subsequent dismissal of the new information was proper.
