G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991
IGNACIO WONG, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and MANUEL MERCADO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ignacio Wong and private respondent Manuel Mercado both claim a right to possess the same parcel of land based on separate transactions with the same owner, William Giger. Mercado acquired possession through a 1973 pacto de retro sale, periodically visiting the land to harvest coconuts and make copra but never residing on it or placing a caretaker. He was aware of Wong’s laborers occupying the land in August 1976 but took no action. Wong, after verifying no one else was on the land, purchased the same property from Giger in July 1976. He then took concrete acts of possession by placing laborers, building a farmhouse, making clearings, fencing boundaries, and posting signboards. Mercado subsequently filed an action for forcible entry against Wong.
The Municipal Court dismissed Mercado’s complaint, finding Wong had prior, actual, and continuous physical possession. On appeal, the Court of First Instance reversed, ruling Mercado had prior possession and ordering Wong to vacate and pay monthly rentals from August 1976.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance correctly ruled that Mercado had prior physical possession to sustain his action for forcible entry against Wong.

RULING

No, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and reinstated the Municipal Court’s dismissal of the complaint. In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The undisputed facts show Mercado’s possession was not exclusive and was merely occasional, limited to periodic harvesting. He did not reside on the land, place a caretaker, or erect any sign of occupation. His knowledge of Wong’s entry in August 1976 and his subsequent inaction further negated any claim of exclusive possession he sought to protect.
In contrast, Wong, upon purchasing the property, performed unequivocal acts of dominion. He placed laborers, built a house, made clearings, and fenced the property. These acts constituted actual, physical, and exclusive possession. Mercado’s prior, sporadic harvesting activities, which were not exclusive and were merely tolerated, cannot prevail over Wong’s concrete and exclusive occupation. Since Mercado failed to prove prior physical possession of such character as would entitle him to remain on the property, his action for forcible entry must fail. The award of rentals was consequently set aside.