G.R. No. L-5; September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Co Kim Cham, filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Judge of First Instance of Manila to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 3012. This case was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings based on two grounds: (1) that the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, invalidated all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, and (2) that the lower courts of the reestablished Commonwealth lacked jurisdiction to continue such proceedings in the absence of an enabling law. The respondent judge further contended that the governments established during the occupation were not de facto governments.
The factual background established that after the Japanese Imperial Forces occupied Manila on January 2, 1942, a Military Administration was proclaimed. This administration allowed, so far as it permitted, the continuation of existing Commonwealth laws and judicial institutions. A civil government called the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Japanese military order on January 23, 1942, which continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and other courts with the same jurisdiction, based on existing statutes and orders. This structure was later succeeded by the inaugurated Republic of the Philippines on October 14, 1943, with no substantial change to the court organization or the laws enforced. Following the landing in Leyte, General MacArthur’s proclamation of October 23, 1944, declared the Commonwealth Government as the sole legal government and that all laws and processes of any other government were null and void in areas free of enemy control. Manila was partially liberated on February 3, 1945, and the Commonwealth Government was fully restored on February 27, 1945.

ISSUE

The principal issues for resolution are:
1. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were valid and remained so after the liberation of the Philippines.
2. Whether General MacArthur’s proclamation of October 23, 1944, invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of those courts.
3. If such judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated, whether the present courts of the reestablished Commonwealth may continue the proceedings that were pending in those courts at the time of liberation.

RULING

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
1. On the first issue, the Court held that the governments established during the Japanese occupation (the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines) were de facto governments of the second kind, or governments of paramount force. Under international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during the occupation were therefore valid and remained so after liberation. The occupation did not dissolve the Philippine state or its sovereignty, which remained vested in the United States and the people of the Philippines. The de facto government’s authority, derived from the occupying military force, obligated inhabitants to obey its ordinances in civil matters.
2. On the second issue, the Court held that General MacArthur’s proclamation of October 23, 1944, did not invalidate the past judicial acts and proceedings of the de facto government’s courts. The proclamation was prospective in nature, declaring such processes “null and void and without legal effect” only in areas free of enemy occupation from that date forward. It did not annul judgments already rendered or proceedings already undertaken. To hold otherwise would create chaos and injustice, as it would invalidate all marriages, contracts, and other juridical acts performed under the de facto government.
3. On the third issue, the Court held that the present courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same courts continued during the occupation (though their functions were suspended during the enemy invasion), have the power and jurisdiction to continue the proceedings pending in those courts at the time of liberation. There is no need for a special enabling law for this purpose. The restoration of the Commonwealth Government automatically restored the jurisdiction of its courts, which includes the authority to take cognizance of and continue cases initiated under the de facto government, provided those acts were valid when performed. The respondent judge was therefore ordered to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. 3012.