G.R. No. L-4943
JEREMIAH J. HARTY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGEL LUNA, defendant-appellant.
February 19, 1909

FACTS: Following a Supreme Court decision (Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs. Leonardo Santos et al., 7 Phil. Rep., 66) that awarded possession of the chapel in the barrio of Concepcion to the Roman Catholic Church, images, ornaments, and jewels that had been used in the chapel for many years disappeared.

Jeremiah J. Harty, the Archbishop of Manila (plaintiff-appellee), brought an action against Angel Luna (defendant-appellant) to recover possession of these properties. The controversy at trial was limited to an image of the Immaculate Conception and its adornments. The lower court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to return only the image.

It was established that the image had been in the possession of and used by the Roman Catholic Church in the chapel for many years. The defendant admitted possession of the image but failed to present any evidence to justify his right to it. The defendant appealed the judgment, raising several procedural and jurisdictional questions.

ISSUE: 1. Did the Court of First Instance lack jurisdiction over the case, given that Act No. 1376 allegedly conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Supreme Court for such controversies?
2. Did the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila lack jurisdiction (venue) because the image was located and the defendant resided in the Province of Rizal?
3. Was the complaint insufficient for failing to allege the specific time the defendant took possession of the property, potentially allowing a demurrer based on the statute of limitations?

RULING: 1. NO. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction. Section 8 of Act No. 1376 , which deals with controversies concerning church property, includes a proviso stating: “That nothing in this Act contained shall prohibit the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church… from instituting actions in the Courts of First Instance… to recover the possession and control of churches, convents, cemeteries, or other property.” The phrase “other property” is not limited to real estate but includes personal property as well. Therefore, the Court of First Instance properly exercised jurisdiction over the action for the recovery of personal property.

2. NO. The Court of First Instance of the City of Manila had proper jurisdiction (venue). The image is personal property. Under Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an action relating to personal property may be brought either in the province where the plaintiff resides or in the province where the defendant resides. Since the plaintiff (Archbishop Harty) resided in the City of Manila, the action was correctly filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

3. NO. The complaint was sufficient. The appellant raised this point by demurrer, suggesting that the lack of a specific date could open the complaint to a statute of limitations defense. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in the answer and cannot be raised by demurrer (citing Aldeguer vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500, and Domingo vs. Osorio, 7 Phil. Rep., 405).

The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.