G.R. No. L-4918
FELICIANA DARIANO, administratrix de bonis non of the property of the deceased Don Francisco de P. de la Rosa and EUGENIO FERNANDEZ, tutor of the minor heirs of the said deceased, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JOSE FERNANDEZ FIDALGO, defendant-appellant.
August 26, 1909

FACTS:
In early 1900, Don Francisco de P. de la Rosa and Jose Fernandez Fidalgo formed a partnership to purchase and operate two cascoes (Nos. 1515 and 2089), agreeing to divide the profits. A dispute arose, and the Supreme Court, in Fernandez vs. De la Rosa, 1 Phil Rep., 671 (February 2, 1903), declared the existence of the partnership, that the cascoes were partnership property, and that Fernandez was entitled to an accounting of De la Rosa’s administration and profits. The case was remanded to the lower court for execution, with the Supreme Court explicitly stating that it did not adjudicate any disputed items of the partnership account.

On April 15, 1903, De la Rosa died, and Carmelino Punsalan was appointed administrator of his estate. A committee was subsequently appointed to hear and allow claims against the estate under Section 669 of the Code of Procedure. Without waiting for the partnership accounting ordered by the Supreme Court, Fernandez dismissed his original action and presented a claim of P17,234.27 against De la Rosa’s estate to this committee. His claim was based on assumed daily profits from the cascoes, without considering significant expenses for repairs or that the cascoes were often out of commission due to their decayed condition. The then-administrator, Punsalan, refused to present any evidence to refute Fernandez’s claim, leading to its allowance by the committee.

On June 30, 1906, Punsalan resigned, and Feliciana Dariano and Eugenio Fernandez (plaintiffs-appellees) were appointed administratrix and tutor, respectively, of De la Rosa’s estate. On December 3, 1906, they commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to declare null and void the P17,234.27 claim allowed by the committee. They argued that the committee lacked authority and jurisdiction, and that the allowance of the claim involved fraud.

The Court of First Instance found that Fernandez’s claim was not sufficiently proven and that fraud had been perpetrated against the estate. It also held that the commission had no jurisdiction to hear the claim because it was an action to demand an accounting of partnership management, which arose after De la Rosa’s death, not an action originating during his lifetime. The lower court thus declared the committee’s decision null and void. Fernandez (defendant-appellant) appealed, asserting that the action originated during De la Rosa’s lifetime, that the commission had jurisdiction, and that the action could not be brought before the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:
1. Did the claim of Jose Fernandez Fidalgo against the estate of Francisco de P. de la Rosa originate during De la Rosa’s lifetime, thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the claims committee?
2. Did the claims committee have jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim based on an unliquidated partnership account, especially when the claim was not properly substantiated?
3. Was there fraud perpetrated against the estate in the allowance of Fernandez’s claim?

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the lower court, declaring null and void the committee’s resolution allowing Fernandez’s claim.

1. Regarding the origin of the claim and committee’s jurisdiction: The Supreme Court reiterated that its prior decision merely ordered an accounting of the partnership and did not adjudicate any specific indebtedness. Fernandez subsequently dismissed his action for accounting. At the time of De la Rosa’s death, the partnership had not been dissolved or liquidated. Fernandez’s claim was against the partnership, not against De la Rosa’s private estate, until the partnership business had been liquidated and it was shown that the partnership assets were insufficient, thus requiring recourse to the private estate. No such debt had arisen against De la Rosa’s private estate before his death. A claim for an outstanding balance after a liquidation subsequent to the death of a person is not an action originating during their lifetime that could be presented to such a commission. Therefore, the claims committee had no authority or jurisdiction to consider Fernandez’s claim.

2. Regarding fraud: The Court found that the claim presented by Fernandez had not been sufficiently proven. The evidence showed that the cascoes required extensive repairs and were often out of commission, yet Fernandez’s claim was based on assumed continuous daily use without accounting for expenses. The previous administrator, Punsalan, failed to present any refuting evidence, which amounted to a perpetration of fraud against the estate. Courts of probate jurisdiction are vigilant in protecting the interests of deceased persons’ estates, and any action tainted with fraud will be remedied.

The Court also implicitly affirmed the Court of First Instance’s jurisdiction to review the findings of the claims commission on appeal, as provided by the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.