GR L 4917; (November, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4917 November 26, 1952
REMEDIOS VDA. DE MIRANDA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. URBANO LEGASPI, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
FACTS
On May 3, 1949, plaintiff Remedios Vda. de Miranda filed an action against forty-nine defendants to recover possession of two parcels of land in Paco, Manila, and monthly rental of P1,200 from January 1946. Defendants filed a motion for a bill of particulars, suspension, or dismissal, which was denied by the court. In their answer, defendants claimed to be possessors in good faith, having occupied the land with plaintiff’s knowledge and consent, paying fixed rentals, and they set up a counterclaim for P56,500 in improvements. When the case was called for hearing on August 23, 1949, neither defendants nor their counsel appeared. The court proceeded to hear plaintiff’s evidence ex-parte and rendered a decision on September 9, 1949, granting plaintiff possession and dismissing defendants’ counterclaim. Defendants filed a motion for new trial, alleging their failure to appear was due to the inadvertence of their counsel’s stenographer/clerk. The court denied the motion, and defendants appealed.
ISSUE
1. Whether the lower court erred in denying defendants’ motion for a bill of particulars or dismissal.
2. Whether the lower court erred in denying defendants’ motion to suspend proceedings under Commonwealth Act No. 538.
3. Whether the lower court erred and abused its discretion in proceeding with an ex-parte trial in the absence of defendants and their counsel.
4. Whether the lower court erred in denying defendants’ motion to set aside the decision and for a new trial.
RULING
1. No. The lower court did not err. The complaint sufficiently alleged defendants were occupying approximately 4,000 square meters of the land without plaintiff’s knowledge and consent, which substantially complied with the rules and apprised defendants of the nature of the complaint to prepare their defense.
2. No. Commonwealth Act No. 538, which provides for automatic suspension of ejectment actions when the government intends to acquire the land, is inapplicable. The present action is an “accion publiciana” or an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession, not a summary ejectment case.
3. and 4. No. The lower court did not err or abuse its discretion. While the defendants’ failure to appear at the trial due to an employee’s mistake could be considered excusable negligence, the granting of a new trial is discretionary. The trial court validly denied the motion because it found the defendants’ defenses unsubstantial. Defendants claimed only to be tenants with plaintiff’s permission, which, even if true, would not justify their indefinite continuance in the property. As owner, plaintiff has the right to re-occupy the land upon giving the required notice, which she did. The defense regarding government expropriation was untenable. The order denying the new trial was affirmed.