GR L 49126; (March, 1946) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-49126; March 25, 1946
E.T. YU CHENGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. YAP ENG CHONG, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On February 27, 1943, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment ordering the defendant, Yap Eng Chong, to vacate the premises at 763 Aguilar, Binondo, Manila, and to pay the plaintiff, E.T. Yu Chengco, back rentals of P68 and a monthly rent of P34 from February 1, 1943, until vacation, plus interest and costs. The defendant did not appeal this judgment. However, after notification, the defendant informed the court he had applied to the committee on house rentals (created by Executive Order No. 117 of the Philippine Executive Commission) for a rent reduction and prayed for suspension of execution. The court suspended execution over the plaintiff’s objection. More than five months later, on July 29, 1943, the committee recommended, and the City Mayor approved, reducing the rent from P34 to P21.25 per month. Subsequently, on November 22, 1943, the trial court modified its final judgment of February 27, 1943, by reducing the rent to P21.25 effective March 1, 1943, and revoking the judgment of ouster, allowing the defendant to continue occupying the premises upon paying the reduced amount. The plaintiff appealed this amendatory order.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in modifying its final and executory judgment and in subordinating it to the decision of the committee on house rentals and the City Mayor.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious. The trial court clearly erred in modifying its judgment after it had become final and executory. It also erred in subordinating its judgment to that of the committee on house rentals and the City Mayor, who were not empowered by law to review or modify the judgment of a competent court. The Court cited a similar case (Carlos vs. Jugo, G.R. No. 48998) where it issued mandamus to compel execution. The Court held that whatever legitimate power the committee might have had to fix rentals could not be exercised after the lease had been declared terminated by a competent court with a judgment of ouster. Accordingly, the order of November 22, 1943, was revoked, and the original decision dated February 27, 1943, was reinstated, with costs against the appellee.