G.R. No. L-48769 February 27, 1987
BARANGAY MATICTIC, Municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE J. M. ELBINIAS as District Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch V and SPOUSES JOSE SERAPIO and GREGORIA PACIDA et al., respondents.

FACTS

The Municipality of Norzagaray filed an expropriation case (Civil Case No. SM-234) against private respondents over a barrio road. The original complaint, filed in 1969, lacked the requisite Presidential approval mandated by Section 2245 of the Revised Administrative Code for a municipality to exercise eminent domain. The municipality later filed an amended complaint alleging it had obtained such authority. The case experienced protracted litigation, including a dismissal for failure to prosecute that was reversed on appeal. When the case was reinstated, the municipal mayor displayed reluctance to prosecute, though the Municipal Council disagreed. Petitioner Barangay Matictic, concerned about the road’s impact on local development, filed a Motion for Intervention in the expropriation case.
The respondent Judge, without ruling on the motion for intervention, issued an Order dated May 12, 1978, dismissing the expropriation case without prejudice. The dismissal was based solely on the jurisdictional defect that the original complaint was filed without the required Presidential approval. The court held that this fatal defect could not be cured by a subsequent amended complaint. Barangay Matictic then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus, challenging the dismissal order and seeking to compel the allowance of its intervention.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the expropriation case and, consequently, in effectively denying the motion for intervention.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The ruling on the expropriation case was legally sound. Under Section 2245(h) of the Revised Administrative Code, a municipal council may exercise eminent domain only with the approval of the President. Jurisdiction over an expropriation case is conferred by law, and compliance with this condition precedent is mandatory for the court to acquire jurisdiction. The filing of the original complaint without this approval was indeed a fatal jurisdictional defect. An amended complaint alleging subsequent compliance cannot retroactively vest jurisdiction in the court, which it never acquired from the inception of the action. Therefore, the dismissal of the main case was correct.
Consequently, the dismissal of the principal expropriation action carried with it the dismissal of the ancillary motion for intervention. An intervention is merely collateral and dependent upon the existence of a pending principal action. With the final dismissal of the main case, there remained no proceeding in which to intervene, rendering the motion for intervention moot. The petitioner’s rights were not prejudiced, as the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the municipality to refile a proper case or for the barangay to pursue a separate proceeding if legally authorized. The writ of mandamus could not issue to compel an act pertaining to a legally terminated case.