G.R. No. L-48724 August 29, 1988
CELESTINO PAHILANGA, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, Judge CFI of Negros Occidental, Br. I, FUNDADOR PAHILANGA, ANTERO PAHILANGA, CARLOS PAHILANGA, ENRIQUETA P. VECERA, and CARLOS SOPIO, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondents, siblings of petitioner Celestino Pahilanga, filed a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages. Summons was served on petitioner through his wife on February 28, 1978. The reglementary 15-day period to answer expired on March 15, 1978. Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion for a 10-day extension only on March 27, 1978, which was beyond the period. The trial court, noting the lapse, required an explanation. While this motion was pending, the court granted private respondents’ motion and declared petitioner in default on April 5, 1978.
Petitioner moved to lift the default order, citing excusable negligence due to his old age, alleged feeble-mindedness, and illness (neuro-arthritis), which he claimed impaired his memory of the summons date. He later submitted a medical certificate. The trial court denied his motion and subsequent reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed this special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift the default order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to set aside the order of default.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on strict compliance with procedural rules and the insufficiency of the proffered excuse for the delay. Service of summons on February 28, 1978, was admitted by petitioner, making the default order valid as no answer or timely motion for extension was filed by March 15. A motion for extension filed after the reglementary period has lapsed merits no approval.
The Court found petitioner’s claim of excusable negligence unmeritorious. His conflicting statements about his illness (initially a heart attack, then neuro-arthritis) cast doubt on its veracity. Critically, the medical certificate indicated the illness disabled him from walking only from March 20, 1978, which was after the answer period had expired. Thus, the alleged illness did not prevent him from consulting a lawyer during the crucial period. Ordinary prudence demanded immediate legal consultation upon receipt of a summons concerning property rights.
Furthermore, the motion to lift default was correctly denied due to the absence of a prima facie valid defense. Petitioner’s bare allegations of purchasing the property in good faith and its subsequent transfer to third parties failed to establish a meritorious defense. The Court emphasized that the discretion to set aside a default order is not exercised absent a clear, justifiable reason for the delay and a showing of a valid defense. Since neither was present, the denial of the motion was proper and within the judge’s sound discretion. The petition was dismissed.