G.R. No. L-48697. April 15, 1988.
FRANCISCA DELA CRUZ and AURELIO DELA CRUZ, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FILOMENA DELA CRUZ, JUANITA DELA CRUZ and HERMIGILDO DELA CRUZ, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. U-649, a judgment was rendered on June 1, 1965. Defendants’ counsel, Atty. Antonio M. Belen, received a copy on August 5, 1965, and filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied in an order dated September 21, 1965. A copy of this denial order was sent by registered mail to Atty. Belen on September 30, 1965. The mail reached the Dagupan City post office on October 1, 1965, but was returned to the court on November 3, 1965, with envelope notations “R & S,” “unclaimed,” and stamped boxes for “2nd notice” and “Last Notice” checked. A second copy was later sent and received by “N.R. Belen” on January 5, 1966.
On January 2, 1976, plaintiffs filed a complaint for revival of judgment, asserting their right of action accrued on January 23, 1966, within the ten-year prescriptive period. Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of prescription, arguing the judgment became final on November 23, 1965. The trial court granted the motion, finding the judgment final and executory as of November 23, 1965, thus barring the revival action.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for revival of judgment on the ground of prescription, specifically, whether service of the order denying reconsideration was complete in November 1965 (rendering the revival action time-barred) or in January 1966 (making it timely).

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order. The pivotal issue was the completeness of service by registered mail of the September 21, 1965 order denying reconsideration. Under Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. An exception provides that if the addressee fails to claim the mail within five days from the postmaster’s first notice, service takes effect at the expiration of that period. However, for this constructive service to apply, there must be conclusive proof that the first notice was actually sent by the postmaster to and received by the addressee.
The trial court erroneously relied solely on the notations on the returned envelope (“unclaimed,” “2nd notice,” “Last Notice”) to presume that the first notice was sent and received, thereby deeming service complete in November 1965. The Supreme Court, citing Barrameda vs. Castillo, held that such notations are insufficient proof. The party relying on constructive service must present clear evidence, such as a postmaster’s certification detailing how, when, and to whom the first notice was delivered, or the mailman’s testimony. In this case, no such evidence was presented. Therefore, service could not be deemed complete in November 1965. Actual receipt occurred on January 5, 1966, when the second copy was received. Consequently, the judgment became final later, and the ten-year period for filing the revival action commenced from that later date. The complaint filed on January 2, 1976, was thus within the prescriptive period. The order of dismissal was set aside, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.