G.R. No. L-48321; August 31, 1946
OH CHO, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

The applicant-appellee, Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China (an alien), applied for the registration of a residential lot in Guinayangan, Tayabas, on January 17, 1940. He purchased the lot in 1938 from the Lagdameos (Antonio, Luis, and Rafael). The applicant and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the lot since 1880. The Director of Lands opposed the application on two grounds: (1) the applicant’s lack of title to the lot, and (2) his disqualification as an alien from acquiring lands of the public domain. The Court of First Instance of Tayabas decreed the registration in favor of Oh Cho. The Director of Lands appealed.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether Oh Cho, an alien, is entitled to a decree of registration for the lot, considering his lack of demonstrated title and his citizenship status.

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the judgment of the lower court and DISMISSED the application for registration.
1. Lack of Title: The applicant failed to show he had acquired title to the lot that could be confirmed under the Land Registration Act ( Act No. 496 ). He did not prove acquisition from the Government by purchase or grant under Spanish laws, or by possessory information. Therefore, the lot is presumed to be part of the public domain. The exception for lands possessed since time immemorial (as in Cariño vs. Insular Government) does not apply, as possession only began in 1880.
2. Alien Disqualification: As the lot is part of the public domain, the applicant, being an alien, is disqualified from acquiring it under the provisions of the Public Land Act ( C.A. No. 141 ). The Court rejected the argument that the applicant acquired a transmissible right from his immediate predecessors-in-interest. Their right was merely a possession that could be availed of by a qualified applicant, not by a disqualified alien. The predecessors-in-interest themselves did not apply for registration and thus had no vested right amounting to title that could be transmitted.
3. Nature of the Land: The Court found it unnecessary to make a definitive pronouncement on whether the residential lot was “agricultural land” under the Constitution, as the dismissal was based on the applicant’s failure to show title and his alienage.
4. Validity of the Sale: The Court declined to declare the 1938 sale null and void in this proceeding, as such a declaration is unnecessary where the vendors do not object to the application, and the matter is best suited for a direct suit between vendor and vendee.
Separate Concurring Opinion (Perfecto, J.):
Justice Perfecto concurred in the result but addressed the constitutional issue directly. He cited an opinion by then Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos stating that residential lots forming part of the public domain are classified as “agricultural lands” because they are neither timber nor mineral and are susceptible of cultivation. Since the Constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain, the purchase by Oh Cho was null and void.
Separate Dissenting Opinion (Briones, J.):
Justice Briones dissented, arguing that the lot was private property, not public land. He reasoned that the long-term, continuous, and unchallenged possession since 1880, under the principles applied in the Cariño case, justified the presumption that the land was private. As private land, an alien has the right to have it registered under the Torrens system, and the Public Land Act is inapplicable.