G.R. No. L-47898; April 30, 1941
MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. P. M. ENDENCIA, as Judge of First Instance of Manila, and VALENTIN TEUS, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Manila Motor Company, Inc., filed a civil case (No. 57408) to collect a sum of money from respondent Valentin Teus. Upon petitioner’s motion, the respondent judge, by order dated August 28, 1940, declared Teus in default for failure to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, despite proper summons. Teus did not move to lift the order of default, even after being notified of it and of the hearing set for September 12, 1940. On September 13, 1940, after the hearing where the petitioner presented its evidence, the respondent judge rendered judgment ordering Teus to pay the petitioner P2,986.01 with 12% annual interest from July 15, 1939, plus P400 as attorney’s fees and costs. This judgment was notified to the petitioner on September 17, 1940. On October 14, 1940, after the judgment became final upon the lapse of 30 days from its promulgation, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On November 1, 1940, the respondent judge denied the motion on the ground that since the judgment had not been notified to respondent Teus, it was not yet final and executory. On November 8, 1940, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the same date, prompting the petitioner to take exception.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for execution on the ground that the judgment was not yet final due to lack of notification to the defendant in default.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus. The petitioner’s theory is correct and is supported by Article 9, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which provides that it is not necessary to furnish copies of pleadings to a party declared in default unless that party has filed a motion to set aside the order of default, in which case he is entitled to notice of all subsequent proceedings. According to this rule, a defendant declared in default has no right to be notified of the final judgment rendered against him, unless he has timely moved to lift the order of default, in which case he is entitled to such notification and to that of all further proceedings. This rule was followed in Diaz v. Mendezona (43 Phil. 495) and Velez v. Ramas (40 Phil. 829). Since respondent Teus was declared in default and did not move to set aside the order of default, he had no right to be notified of the final judgment. Consequently, the judgment should have been ordered executed by the respondent judge when the motion for that purpose was filed by the petitioner. The orders of November 1 and 8, 1940, are set aside, and the respondent judge, or whoever is presiding over civil case No. 57408, is ordered to issue the writ of execution immediately. Costs are taxed against respondent Valentin Teus.