GR L 47669; (May, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-47669; May 3, 1941
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOAQUIN LIPANA, accused. ELIODORA LIPANA, offended party-appellant.
FACTS
Eliodora Lipana charged Joaquin Lipana in the Court of First Instance of Cavite with the crime of estafa for the alleged malicious destruction of a will (not yet admitted to probate) in which she was supposedly instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, Manuela Lipana. The provincial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the information, and the court granted the dismissal. The offended party, Eliodora Lipana, appealed from this order of dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the offended party in a criminal case has the right to appeal from an order dismissing the case upon motion of the provincial fiscal.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court, reiterating the rule established in People v. Moll and Gonzalez v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, held that an offended party has no right to appeal from an order of dismissal issued by the court upon motion of the provincial fiscal based on the insufficiency of evidence. The provincial fiscal is the sole judge to determine whether to insist on the prosecution after a preliminary investigation, considering the evidence available to sustain the complaint. To compel the fiscal to proceed despite his opinion on the insufficiency of evidence would be to insist on the acquittal of the accused.
The remedy of the offended party is to institute a separate civil action for the recovery of civil liability (indemnity for damages), with proper reservation made for that purpose. While the criminal action is being prosecuted by the fiscal, the offended party may intervene to preserve civil rights and may appeal from any ruling adverse to such rights. However, once the criminal action is dismissed on the fiscal’s motion, the offended party’s right to intervene ceases, and an appeal from the dismissal is not permissible. Allowing such an appeal would give the offended party direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to Section 107 of General Orders No. 58.
Furthermore, the question of whether the accused actually destroyed the will is a question of fact, and the opinion of the trial court on this matter cannot be disturbed on appeal.
The appeal was dismissed, with costs against appellant Eliodora Lipana.