G.R. No. L-47639; April 30, 1941
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante y apelado, vs. VALENTIN NICOLAS, acusado y apelante.

FACTS

The accused, Valentin Nicolas, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya with the crime of murder for killing Saturnino Benito with a shotgun, employing treachery and nocturnity, and committing the crime in the victim’s own dwelling. He pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, with the accessory penalties, and to pay the costs. The accused appealed.
The evidence established the following facts: On June 19, 1939, around six in the evening, the victim was distributing free wine called “Sy Hoc Tong” at a Chinese store in barrio La Torre, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The appellant was among the guests but stopped drinking after tasting the wine. This angered the victim, who struck the appellant twice on the neck. The appellant showed no resentment, and both later went home. Upon reaching his house, the victim asked his companion, Maria Manuel, to prepare his dinner. After eating, he lay down on the split bamboo floor of the kitchen and fell asleep. Maria Manuel continued eating and soon heard a gunshot from underneath the kitchen, precisely where the victim was lying. She found the victim wounded in the back, chest, and right forearm. Dr. A.Y. Lumanlan performed an autopsy and found that the projectiles entered through the back and exited through the chest, causing fatal wounds that affected important arteries of the heart.
Informed of the incident, Lieutenant Angel C. Magallanes of the Constabulary sent Corporal P. Ysip and soldiers P. Bingayan and Pedro Fernandez to the crime scene. Accompanied by police chief Esteban Lopez and after learning how the crime occurred, they went to the appellant’s house and asked him to show his shotgun. The appellant voluntarily surrendered his shotgun, cartridge belt, one empty shell, and three loaded shells. The agents noted the shotgun had been recently fired.
Upon interrogation, the appellant voluntarily admitted he killed the victim with his shotgun. Bingayan and Lopez arrested him and took him to the Constabulary barracks in Bayombong. During the trip, the appellant again voluntarily admitted to the killing. At the barracks, his admissions were typewritten by Lieutenant Magallanes. Subsequently, the appellant was brought before Justice of the Peace Vicente Singson, before whom he signed and swore to his written admissions after the judge verified they were his own and made voluntarily.

ISSUE

1. Whether the appellant’s extrajudicial confessions (Exhibit B) are admissible and have probative value, or were obtained through force, torture, or were actually the interpreter’s statements.
2. Whether the physical evidence (Exhibits C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4: shotgun, belt, cartridges) seized without a warrant is admissible.
3. Whether the testimony of witness Bingayan is credible despite minor contradictions.
4. Whether the prosecution’s failure to present all witnesses listed in the information implies suppression of evidence favorable to the defense.
5. Whether the guilt of the appellant has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Whether the crime committed is murder and what penalty is proper.

RULING

1. On the admissibility of the confessions: The trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit B and giving it probative value. It was proven that Lieutenant Magallanes typewritten the document while asking questions in English, which were translated alternately by Bingayan and Lopez; the appellant answered in Ilocano, and Magallanes, who understood and wrote the dialect, directly typewritten the answers. Therefore, the ruling in U.S. vs. Chu Chio is inapplicable because here the admissions were not written through an interpreter; they were the appellant’s own. Furthermore, Magallanes, Bingayan, and Lopez testified under oath that the admissions were made and typewritten as described. The incidental claim that the appellant was incomunicado for nearly two days, infringing his constitutional rights, is unfounded as the evidence does not show he was deprived of any constitutional right.
2. On the admissibility of the physical evidence: The shotgun, belt, and cartridges, although seized by agents without a search warrant, were voluntarily surrendered by the appellant without any pressure. Under these circumstances, the appellant cannot now claim these objects are inadmissible as evidence against him because he waived his right by voluntarily delivering them (citing People vs. Malasugui).
3. On the credibility of witness Bingayan: The defense’s claim that Bingayan’s testimony lacks credit due to minor contradictions is without merit. Reading his declaration shows he substantially reproduced the facts as they occurred. His entire testimony cannot be rejected, especially as important details were corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
4. On the non-presentation of all witnesses: The fact that the prosecution did not present all witnesses named in the information is unimportant. Their non-appearance does not mean the prosecution suppressed evidence that would have favored the defense, as their testimonies would have been merely corroborative.
5. On the proof of guilt: The evidence flatly rejects the defense’s insinuation that the murderer could have been Maria Manuel, her relatives, or other persons. The appellant’s guilt has been satisfactorily established beyond reasonable doubt by his voluntary confessions, reiterated while being taken to the Constabulary barracks, sworn to before Justice of the Peace Singson, and corroborated by the victim’s death and wounds, and by the discovery of the recently fired shotgun and the empty shell in the appellant’s possession.
6. On the crime and penalty: The crime committed by the appellant is murder as defined in Article 248, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for having committed it with treachery. The generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, nocturnity, and dwelling are not appreciated because the first is not satisfactorily proven, and the last two are considered absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery. No mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime. Therefore, the penalty prescribed by law, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, should be imposed in its medium period, which is reclusion perpetua.
The appealed judgment is in accordance with law and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.