GR L 47557; (April, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-47557; April 22, 1941
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado, vs. MARTIN CONWI, acusado-apelante.
FACTS
The accused, Martin Conwi, pleaded guilty to the crime of falsification of a private document. The Court of First Instance of Manila found him guilty and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor to one year and one day of prision correccional, a fine of P500, indemnification of P150.17 to the offended party, with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and payment of one-fourth of the costs. The accused appealed. The appellant does not dispute his guilt or question the penalty imposed but argues that the appealed judgment is illegal and null because it was rendered by Judge Roman A. Cruz, who at the time had been appointed as a relief judge for the Province of Bulacan. It occurred that said judge had indeed been designated for that province for the months of April and May 1940 under Administrative Order No. 28 of the Department of Justice. However, said administrative order was amended by No. 32 dated March 11, 1940, which assigned the mentioned judge to serve as a relief judge in the City of Manila during the month of May of the same year, when the hearing of the case was held and the appealed conviction was rendered.
ISSUE
The primary issue raised by the appellant is whether the judge who tried and sentenced him lacked jurisdiction. An ancillary issue addressed by the Solicitor General is whether the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
RULING
The Court found the appellant’s claim regarding the judge’s lack of jurisdiction to be without merit. The administrative records showed that Judge Roman A. Cruz was validly assigned to serve in Manila during the relevant period (May 1940) when the case was heard and decided. Therefore, he had jurisdiction.
On the issue of the penalty, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the penalty imposed by the trial court was incorrect and less than what the law prescribes. The defense claimed the presence of two mitigating circumstances: voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary surrender to authorities immediately after the crime was committed, with no aggravating circumstances. The Court, concurring with the Solicitor General, ruled that the second mitigating circumstance (voluntary surrender) was not proven and was contradicted by the record showing the accused was arrested along with his co-accused on a specified date. Thus, only one mitigating circumstance (plea of guilty) was present in favor of the accused.
Applying Article 172, No. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. With one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum degree, which is from two years, four months, and one day to three years, six months, and twenty days. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty to be imposed is from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional.
The appealed judgment was modified accordingly. The appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, with costs of this instance against the appellant.
