G.R. No. L-47456; April 8, 1941
ASUNCION PEREZ VDA. DE DE LA VIÑA, MANUEL, ALEJANDRINO, PILAR, CESAR, EDUARDO and JAYME, all surnamed DE LA VIÑA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SIMON BUENAVENTURA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On September 27, 1938, defendant Simon Buenaventura obtained a loan of P4,500 from Delfin de la Viña, the plaintiffs’ predecessor, payable on or before March 31, 1939. As security, the defendant constituted a second mortgage on his three lots (Nos. 591, 592, and 838 of the cadastral survey of Pilar, Capiz). As an additional guaranty, the debtor assigned to the creditor “novecientos (900) picos de azucar de exportacion que se convierten de las canas sembradas y cortadas en los tres lotes de terreno … correspondientes a la cosecha 1939-40.” The defendant failed to pay the obligation at maturity. Consequently, on April 3, 1939, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for the foreclosure of the mortgage, praying that the three lots and the 900 piculs of export centrifugal sugar be sold at public auction. The defendant interposed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground of prematurity, contending that the mortgage on the lots and the sugar was indivisible. Since the 900 piculs of sugar were not yet in existence at the time the foreclosure action was instituted (the milling season not having commenced), the defendant argued the entire action was premature. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint, prompting the plaintiffs’ appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, which included as security the 900 piculs of export centrifugal sugar from a future crop, was premature because the sugar was not yet in existence when the complaint was filed.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court and held that the demurrer should have been overruled. The Court ruled that the foreclosure of the mortgage on the three lots and on the 900 piculs of export centrifugal sugar could be decreed simultaneously. However, after the judgment of foreclosure, the mortgaged properties could be ordered sold at different times if a simultaneous sale was impossible. Furthermore, the Court found no legal obstacle to the sale of the 900 piculs of sugar even though they were not actually in existence at the time of the order of sale. A valid sale may be made of a thing which, though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence. In this case, the 900 piculs of export sugar were reasonably certain to come into existence at a determinate time as the natural by-product of the sugar cane then actually growing on the three mortgaged lots. The case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.