G.R. No. L-47408. April 8, 1941.
POTENCIANA REBOTOC, FELICIDAD GERALDE, MARIA GERALDE y LORING REBOTOC, petitioners, vs. JUAN A. BENITEZ, as Justice of the Peace of Dagupan, Pangasinan, and PAZ MANUEL, respondents.

FACTS

This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition filed by Potenciana Rebotoc, Felicidad Geralde, Maria Geralde, and Loring Rebotoc against Justice of the Peace Juan A. Benitez of Dagupan, Pangasinan, and Paz Manuel. Petitioners sought a declaration that their constitutional right to a speedy trial in Criminal Case No. 10456 (“The People of the Philippines vs. Potenciana Rebotoc, et al.”) for slight physical injuries had been violated. They prayed for a peremptory writ commanding the respondent judge to dismiss the case definitively and for a writ of prohibition against the respondents to prevent Paz Manuel from filing another criminal complaint based on the same facts and the judge from accepting it.
The petition was based on alleged unreasonable postponements of the trial by the respondent judge over the petitioners’ objections. The first hearing was set for January 22, 1940. On that date, the lawyers for respondent Paz Manuel moved for postponement, which was opposed by petitioners. The judge granted it and reset the hearing for February 5, 1940. On January 30, 1940, Paz Manuel’s lawyers again moved for postponement. The judge granted the motion without petitioners’ consent, setting the hearing for February 19, 1940. On February 19, at petitioners’ request, the hearing was postponed to February 29, 1940. On February 27, Paz Manuel’s lawyers moved for another postponement. The judge granted it, resetting the hearing to March 9, 1940, without the consent or knowledge of the petitioners. On February 29, petitioners appeared ready for trial, protested the postponement order, and on March 9, they moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging a violation of their right to a speedy trial. The respondent judge denied the motion. Subsequently, at petitioners’ request, the trial was suspended pending the resolution of this mandamus and prohibition petition.
The respondent judge, in his answer, presented a different account supported by court orders: The first postponement from January 22 to February 5 was by mutual agreement. The second, from February 5 to February 19, was granted at Paz Manuel’s request (due to her lead counsel’s urgent personal matter) and was noted as unopposed. The third, from February 19 to February 29, was granted at petitioners’ own request. The fourth, from February 29 to March 9, was granted at Paz Manuel’s request (due to her counsels’ urgent personal matter). Petitioners then sought a postponement of the March 9 hearing to file a memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss, which the judge denied on April 2, 1940, resetting the hearing for April 8. Petitioners did not oppose this but, via a telegram dated April 5, requested a postponement from April 8 to April 11 due to their counsel’s commitment to attend an investigation in Baguio. The judge granted this over Paz Manuel’s opposition, resetting the hearing for April 12 and 13. Afterwards, both parties filed a joint motion to hold the hearing on April 13 only, which the judge granted. On April 13, petitioners moved to suspend the hearing to allow them to file the present petition.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Justice of the Peace violated the petitioners’ constitutional right to a speedy trial by granting several postponements of the hearing in Criminal Case No. 10456.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court denied the petition. Examining the sequence of postponements, the Court found that: the first and seventh postponements were by mutual agreement of the parties; the third, fifth, sixth, and eighth were made at the petitioners’ own request; and only the second and fourth were made at the request of respondent Paz Manuel. Furthermore, the Court noted that the postponements requested by Paz Manuel were made only after certified copies of the motions were sent in advance to the petitioners. In view of these facts, the Court held that it could not declare that the petitioners’ constitutional right to a speedy and expeditious trial had been violated. The petition was denied, with costs against the petitioners.