G.R. No. L-47346; April 8, 1941
FRANCISCO B. REYES, appellant, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, appellee.

FACTS

The appellant, Francisco B. Reyes, was the justice of the peace of Talacogon, Agusan. By an order dated January 28, 1935, from the Secretary of Justice, he was temporarily suspended from office. Consequently, he ceased performing his duties from February 7, 1935. He was definitively separated from the service on November 14, 1936, due to the appointment and qualification of his successor under section 4, Article XV, of the Philippine Constitution. Reyes filed a claim for payment of his salary covering the period of his suspension. The appellee, Auditor General Jaime Hernandez, disallowed this claim. The disallowance was based on section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that payment of salary during suspension is only permissible “upon subsequent reinstatement of the suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible.” The appellant appealed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the appellant, Francisco B. Reyes, is entitled to receive his salary for the period of his suspension from office.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the appeal, ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the payment of his salary during the suspension period. The Court held that under section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code, the right to such payment is contingent upon either the suspended official’s reinstatement or his exoneration (if reinstatement is impossible due to death). In this case, the appellant was neither reinstated nor officially exonerated. His separation from service resulted from the appointment of his successor under the Constitution’s transitory provision, which constituted an indirect removal. This action by the Chief Executive did not equate to reinstatement or exoneration. The Court emphasized the general principle that a public official is not entitled to compensation for services not rendered, and payment during suspension is justified only if the suspension was unwarranted or the official was innocent. The fact that the Undersecretary of Justice later favorably recommended the appellant’s application for retirement gratuity (under Commonwealth Act No. 331 ) did not satisfy the legal requirement for reinstatement or exoneration under section 260.
DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Moran):
Justice Moran dissented, arguing that the appellant’s suspension was illegal from the outset because, under sections 228 and 229 of the Revised Administrative Code, the power to order a temporary suspension lay with the Judge of First Instance of the district, not the Secretary of Justice. Furthermore, the charges against the appellant were never definitively substantiated by a final adjudication from the Chief Executive, the only authority empowered to make such a determination. Therefore, in the eyes of the law, the appellant remained innocent. The appointment of a successor under the Constitution was not a removal based on a finding of guilt. Given the illegal suspension, the lack of a final guilty verdict, and the subsequent approval of his retirement gratuity based on “faithful and satisfactory” service, the appellant should be deemed virtually exonerated for the purpose of authorizing salary payment. The impossibility of his reinstatement was due to constitutional operation (as he was not a member of the Bar), not the administrative charges, which should be as effective as “death” under the law. Requiring literal exoneration under these circumstances would be an overly technical and unjust application of the law.