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JUAN KABIGTING, recurrente, vs. HONORABLE POTENCIANO PECSON, ETC., recurrido. MARIA PELAYO, ET AL., terceristas-recurridos.
FACTS
Maria Pelayo and her siblings obtained a decree on February 24, 1934, for Lot No. 1206 of the Cabiao cadastre. On April 5, 1934, Juan Kabigting (the petitioner) filed a motion in the same case to review the decree. The judge, Hon. Catalino Buenaventura, granted the motion on January 28, 1938, setting aside the decree issued in favor of the Pelayos on the ground of fraud. Kabigting then filed his answer for the lot. During the presentation of evidence, it was discovered that a portion of Lot No. 1206 had been segregated as a distinct lot, No. 2472. Both parties filed their respective answers for the segregated portion and requested that the claims for both lots be heard jointly. During the trial, on December 14, 1939, Maria Pelayo and her siblings filed a motion requesting the appointment of a receiver for the products (consisting of fish) of the lots in question. On the same date, the respondent Judge, Hon. Potenciano Pecson, granted the motion and appointed Francisco Pongco as receiver of the products, fixing his bond at P500. On December 20, 1939, Kabigting’s lawyer learned of the order and immediately filed a motion to set it aside. This motion was denied by the court’s order of January 15, 1940. On January 22, 1940, Kabigting moved to terminate the receivership by filing a bond of P300 in favor of the Pelayos. This motion was also denied by the respondent Judge’s order of February 10, 1940. Kabigting obtained a preliminary prohibitory injunction from the Supreme Court. He contends that the order appointing a receiver is null and void for having been issued arbitrarily, with abuse of discretion, and in excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, arbitrarily, or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order appointing a receiver for the products of the litigated properties.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioner. The Court held that the appointment of a receiver was proper and lawful. The properties (fishponds) were in litigation between the parties, and their products were harvested at certain seasons. To better secure the rights of both parties pending final judgment, the appointment of a receiver was deemed an appropriate and adequate remedy. The Court found that the respondent Judge acted in accordance with law and sound discretion, based on Section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure (specifically paragraphs 2 and 4), which allows the appointment of a receiver when it is shown that the property in litigation is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or whenever it is the most convenient and adequate means for the preservation and administration of the property during the pendency of the action. The Court emphasized that the appointment does not deprive any party of possession but places the property under the administration of the court through its agent, the receiver. Consequently, there was no arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent Judge.
