GR L 265; (April, 1946) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-265; April 24, 1946
ONG SU HAN, petitioner, vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of Manila, TAN ENG GEE, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
FACTS
On April 2, 1945, respondent Tan Eng Gee sued petitioner Ong Su Han for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on April 16, 1945. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance. On July 11, 1945, the Court of First Instance, pursuant to a compromise agreement submitted by the parties’ attorneys, entered a judgment of ouster. The agreement stipulated that no writ of execution would be issued before November 30, 1945, provided the defendant paid monthly rents, and the defendant waived his right to appeal. The defendant later attempted to have the decision vacated, claiming lack of authority of his counsel, but failed. A writ of execution was issued on December 20, 1945. The petitioner filed a certiorari proceeding with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on January 9, 1946. On January 18, 1946, the petitioner filed in the trial court an amended petition for suspension of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 . Respondent Judge Jose Gutierrez David denied the suspension, noting the defendant had exhausted legal resources to delay execution and that the judgment was based on a party agreement. Previously, on January 16, 1946, Judge Buenaventura Ocampo, to whom the case was then assigned, had ordered a suspension of execution and set a hearing for January 19, 1946. However, due to a reassignment of cases, the records were returned to respondent Judge Gutierrez David, who, without conducting a formal hearing, denied the suspension on January 19, 1946.
ISSUE
1. Whether the granting of a suspension of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 is mandatory or discretionary upon the court.
2. Whether respondent Judge Gutierrez David committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for suspension without conducting a formal hearing.
RULING
1. The granting of suspension under Commonwealth Act No. 689 is discretionary. The Court construed Sections 4 and 5 of the Act together. Section 4 states the court “may, at its discretion” suspend execution, while Section 5 states the court “shall grant the suspension” if specified conditions are found. The Court held that the use of “shall” in this context does not make the grant mandatory; it specifies the conditions for relief. If the conditions are present, the court may still, in its discretion, deny the suspension for valid reasons. Any abuse of this discretion is reviewable by certiorari.
2. No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The Court found no abuse in the denial of suspension because the judgment of dispossession was entered on July 11, 1945, more than six months before the request for suspension. Citing the similar case of Tiangco vs. Liboro, the Court ruled that the purpose of the law is to give the petitioner time to find another dwelling, and the petitioner had ample time (nearly six months) to do so. Furthermore, the Court held that a judge is not legally prevented from revoking an interlocutory order (like Judge Ocampo’s suspension order) issued by another judge in the same case subsequently assigned to him. Respondent Judge was not required to hear the parties if a review of the record convinced him the suspension was improperly granted. The Court did not find it necessary to decide whether a judgment based on a compromise agreement entered before the law’s passage (October 15, 1945) could be suspended over the plaintiff’s objection. The petition was denied, the preliminary injunction dissolved, and execution was allowed to proceed, with costs against the petitioner.
Separate Opinion (Dissent by Justice Pablo):
Justice Pablo dissented, arguing that the right to a hearing is an essential element of due process. He contended that it was a grave injustice for the respondent Judge to decide a matter adversely affecting the petitioner without granting him his day in court, regardless of the merits of the decision.
