GR L 469; (March, 1908) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-469
T.H. PARDO DE TAVERA, ET AL., trustees of the College of San Jose, plaintiffs, vs. THE HOLY ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., defendants.
March 13, 1908
FACTS: On January 5, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission promulgated Act No. 69 , which created a board of trustees (plaintiffs) to take possession and manage the property of the College of San Jose in Manila, to maintain a School of Medicine and Pharmacy. Section 4 of said Act directed the board to file a petition in the Supreme Court to oust the rector of the University of Santo Tomas (representing the Roman Catholic Church) from possession of the college properties.
On February 3, 1902, the board of trustees, represented by the Attorney-General and Felipe G. Calderon, filed an amended petition, naming the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church (represented by the Archbishop of Manila and the Apostolic Delegate) and Raymundo Velazquez (rector of the University of Santo Tomas) as defendants. The petition alleged that the property was in the possession of the rector of UST, who claimed ownership and control for the Roman Catholic Church, denying the plaintiffs’ authority. The plaintiffs prayed for a decree ousting the defendants and placing the trustees in possession.
The defendants, through their attorneys, filed an answer asserting that the rector’s immediate possession, management, and control of the college was a “special and particular property right” under the U.S. Constitution, conferred by the King of Spain and recognized after American occupation.
Years later, on or about June 8, 1907, an agreement was entered into between William H. Taft (Secretary of War, representing the Philippine Government) and Jeremiah J. Harty (Archbishop of Manila, representing the Roman Catholic Church). This agreement was intended to compromise several controversies, including the case involving the College of San Jose. It stipulated that the Archbishop of Manila, for the Roman Catholic Church, would take “absolute title” and possession of the college, free from government claims, to be administered for the specific purposes of its foundation. This agreement was made subject to the approval of the Philippine Commission and implementation through “consent decrees” in courts and necessary legislation.
Act No. 1724 subsequently confirmed and ratified this agreement. Section 2 of Act No. 1724 authorized and directed the Attorney-General to stipulate with the defendants in this case for a judgment decreeing to the Roman Catholic Church (as represented by the Archbishop of Manila) the right of possession and absolute title to the college properties, to be administered for its specific foundation purposes.
Pursuant to Act No. 1724 , the Attorney-General filed a motion requesting the Supreme Court to enter such a decision. However, defendant Raymundo Velazquez (Rector of the University of Santo Tomas), through his attorney, opposed the motion. His opposition was based on the grounds that he was a party defendant with a direct interest in the property, was not represented in the Taft-Harty agreement, did not consent to its conditions, and that the court had no authority to enter a decree except upon the stipulation of all parties to the action.
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court enter a “consent decree” disposing of the College of San Jose properties in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, based on an agreement between the government and the Archbishop, when one of the original defendants (the Rector of the University of Santo Tomas) explicitly objects and has not stipulated to the agreement?
RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is only authorized to enter a “consent decree” disposing of the property when all parties to the action have stipulated to the agreement. In this case, Raymundo Velazquez, a party defendant who claimed a direct interest in the property, had not stipulated to the agreement and actively opposed the motion for a consent decree. Without the stipulation of all parties, the court lacked the authority to grant a decree disposing of the property in accordance with the agreement between the Government and the Archbishop. Therefore, the Attorney-General’s motion was denied.
