G.R. No. L-4681 July 31, 1951
MARCELA DE BORJA VDA. DE TORRES, SATURNINA DE BORJA VDA. DE ORTEGA, EUFRACIA DE BORJA VDA. DE LIMACO, JACOBO DE BORJA, OLIMPIA DE BORJA, AND JUAN DE BORJA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and CRISANTO DE BORJA, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, the surviving children and heirs of Quintin de Borja (who was a child of Marcelo de Borja), contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge. The Judge issued an order directing them to deliver a parcel of land to the administrator of the intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja (Special Proceeding No. R-2414). Petitioners assert exclusive ownership and possession of this land. They argue the administrator’s proper remedy to recover it is a separate action at law, not a motion within the intestate proceeding. In the intestate estate, commissioners submitted a project of partition on February 8, 1944, which included the disputed land as property of Marcelo de Borja’s estate and assigned it to an heir, Miguel B. Dayco. Petitioners objected, but the partition was approved in February 1946, and this approval was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1949. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja’s estate was the named party in the partition, petitioners were considered the real parties because they had been declared their father’s sole heirs, and one of them was the administratrix. Petitioners had previously moved for and secured an order for the execution of the partition to receive their own share and defended the probate court’s action in a prior certiorari case.

ISSUE

Whether the probate court (respondent Judge) has jurisdiction to issue an order, via a motion within the intestate proceeding, directing petitioners to deliver the disputed land to the estate administrator, despite petitioners’ claim of exclusive ownership and possession.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the probate court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 91 (now relevant rules on estate settlement), after payment of estate obligations, the court shall assign the residue to the rightful persons, who may demand and recover their shares from the executor, administrator, or “any other person having the same in his possession.” Citing the analogous case of De Jesus vs. Daza, the Court held the probate court, having custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical and convenient authority to effectuate delivery within the same proceeding, without requiring a separate action. The Court found additional reinforcing factors: the partition had been approved and become a final judgment; petitioners had already received property assigned to them under that same partition; and they had actively sought execution of the partition and defended the probate court’s authority in prior proceedings. Thus, petitioners are estopped from attacking the partition’s validity or the court’s jurisdiction. The Court also held that the petitioners’ claim of title was concluded by the final partition, which brought the property under the court’s control (in custodia legis); any challenge to the inclusion of the property should have been via a direct attack on the partition (e.g., for fraud, mistake), not a collateral attack as attempted in this case.