GR L 46715; (July, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-46715-16 July 29, 1988
LEONCIA T. ZAIDE and PRIMITIVO ZAIDE, substituted by SIMEON TOLENTINO, Guardian ad litem of the Minors PACITA, ALEX, MARIA ZERLINA all surnamed ZAIDE, etc., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO DE LEON and EDITA T. ZAIDE, respondents.
FACTS
Spouses Edita Zaide and Roberto de Leon were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Makati. In the mid-1960s, Edita’s brother, Primitivo Zaide, and his wife, Leoncia, gave the de Leons a P2,000 loan to redeem the land from a mortgage and transferred a jitney valued at P7,000 to them. The Zaide spouses claimed this was part of the purchase price for the land. On January 11, 1965, Edita executed a Deed of Sale over the land to Leoncia for P5,000. This first deed bore Roberto’s marital consent but omitted the names of both spouses’ husbands, causing the Register of Deeds to reject it. A second deed, identical in all material terms and notarial details but including the husbands’ names, was then presented and accepted, leading to the issuance of a new title in Leoncia’s name. The Zaides used the land as collateral to build an apartment.
After a fire destroyed their home in 1969, the de Leons moved into the apartment but refused to pay rent. They filed a complaint alleging the second deed of sale was a forgery. The Zaides counter-sued for ejectment and recovery of rentals. The trial court initially upheld the sale’s validity. Upon reconsideration, however, it reversed itself, accepting an NBI expert’s testimony that the signatures on the second deed were forged and declaring the title void.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the second deed of sale (Exhibit 2) is a forgery, thereby nullifying the transfer of title to the Zaide spouses.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s original judgment validating the sale. The legal logic centers on the relationship between the two deeds and the presumption of regularity. The Court found the second deed was not a forgery but a mere re-execution to cure a formal defect in the first. Both deeds were identical in substantive terms—parties, property, price, date, and notarial details—differing only in the inclusion of the husbands’ names. This indicated a single transaction, not a new one.
Critically, the first deed (Exhibit 1) was genuine and notarized, creating a strong presumption of due execution and regularity. The de Leons failed to rebut this presumption. The Court gave little weight to the handwriting analysis on the second deed, as the expert’s testimony was conclusory and ignored contrary evidence, including the notarization and the de Leons’ failure to promptly dispute the sale despite the construction of a building on the land. Since the valid first deed embodied the parties’ agreement, the second deed’s purpose was merely to facilitate registration. Therefore, the title issued to the Zaides was valid. Consequently, the de Leons were liable for unpaid rentals and were ordered to vacate the premises.
