G.R. No. L-4652; August 30, 1951
Emilio Santos and Aurelia Santos, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Asuncion Santos assisted by her husband Lorenzo de Vera, and Registrar of Deeds of Rizal, Gregorio Velasquez, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

In Land Registration Case No. 113, G.L.R.O. No. 865, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision on June 18, 1948, ordering the registration of two parcels of land in the name of Asuncion Santos. The corresponding decree was issued on July 28, 1948, and Certificate of Title No. 53 was subsequently issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. On March 18, 1949, Emilio Santos and Aurelia Santos filed an ordinary civil action (Civil Case No. 797) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Asuncion Santos, her husband, and the Register of Deeds. They prayed, under Section 38 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act), that the decision, decree, and title issued in favor of Asuncion Santos be declared null and void on the ground of fraud. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision declaring the decree and certificate of title null and void and ordering their cancellation. The defendants appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in taking cognizance of a petition to reopen a decree under Section 38 of Act No. 496 in an ordinary civil case (Civil Case No. 797) instead of requiring it to be filed in the original land registration case where the decree was issued.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. 797. The Court held that the petition filed by the appellees was clearly one for review of a registration decree under Section 38 of Act No. 496 . Section 112 of the same Act provides that any petition filed under its provisions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered. Citing Cavan vs. Wislizenus (48 Phil. 632), the Court ruled that land registration proceedings are separate and distinct from ordinary civil actions. Allowing such petitions to be filed elsewhere would lead to confusion and make it difficult to trace the origin of entries in the registry. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of error regarding the alleged fraud. The dismissal was without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs-appellees to file the proper petition in the original registration case within one year from July 28, 1948, deducting the period during which Civil Case No. 797 was pending.